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/For historical background on land tenure in Taiwan as it is indirectly related to the Taichung peasants, see category 116, pp. 88-90./

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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ists brought a change in regime to Taiwan. This is known as the "Restoration." At the outset the Taiwanese people welcomed the change, feeling that the coming of the Chinese represented a reunion with their own "race." With the advent of peace, there was a general return of men to the land. Only one Hsin Hsing villager had been killed in the war in Southeast Asia. The other villagers from Hsin Hsing who had surrendered or been taken as prisoners while working in Japanese labor groups were returned to Taiwan in ships. The return of these men to the land was followed by a general population increase, and in the Hsin Hsing area this quickly aggravated the problem of land scarcity; tenancy became a greater problem than ever before. Families could neither buy nor rent enough land to support themselves adequately, and, in addition, the war period had brought about a significant alteration in local patterns of division of labor. In the absence of the men the women had assumed new roles and responsibilities and had begun to take an active part in the operation of the land. This change was so well established that from about 1948 on it became possible for the men to work elsewhere for periods of varying length to supplement the family's farm income. This was the beginning of a new and ever-increasing trend of mobility to Taipei, a trend not confined to the Hsin Hsing area, although it may have begun there earlier than in most other parts of Taiwan. Some men hired out as farm laborers or worked as itinerant merchants in the area. But it is significant that local industrial development has been so slight that it has offered no economic alternatives to the villagers.

After 1949, when the movement of the remnants of the Chinese Nationalist forces from the mainland to Taiwan was halted, the regime instituted a new policy of government rule and reform. The Land Reform Acts between 1949 and 1953 were the most important aspect of this policy. The Land Reform, the increased availability of fertilizer, the infusion of great quantities of economic aid from the United States, and the great increase of supplementary income from villagers working in Taipei have all contributed to an apparent rise in the Taiwanese farmer's standard of living. But the basic problem of population pressure and land scarcity continues to worsen, affecting both economic and social aspects of village life.

LANGUAGE AS AN INDICATION OF HISTORICAL SEQUENCE

In 1958 there were four main languages spoken in Taiwan: Japanese, Taiwanese, Mandarin, and Hakka. The latter three are usually referred to as dialects of Chinese, but since they are not mutually intelligible, they are actually different languages, and will be referred

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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having their residence in Taipei—which is reflected in the reverse sex ratio in the village, that is, more females than males—many other villagers, both male and female, who work in Taipei continue to register their residence in Hsin Hsing.

This means that the number of registered villagers who actually live permanently in the village is well below the census figure. In fact, during the agricultural slack seasons in recent years, the actual proportion of villagers working in the city may come close to 15 percent of the total registered population. Many of them, especially the males, return to the village for the planting and harvesting. At these times they may cultivate their own fields, or at harvesttime join with groups

TABLE 10

AGE GROUPS BY PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN HSIN HSING VILLAGE, 1956

Ages	Number	Percent
0–10	206	32.1
11–20	159	24.8
21–30	88	13.7
31–40	78	12.2
41–50	45	7.0
51–60	34	5.3
61–70	19	3.0
70 and over	12	1.9
Total	641	100.0

of fellow villagers in exchanging labor, or hire out as members of village labor teams. (Farm labor will be discussed in detail in the chapter on agriculture.)

If we were to deduct the registered villagers who have actually lived and worked in Taipei in the past several years, we would see that the village population apparently reached its optimum size during the early 1950's. Its growth has more or less leveled off despite the continuing high rate of natural increase. This is clearly indicated in the most recent village population figures (not used in this section) which give 609 inhabitants as the village total. This figure is thus more like the village population figures for 1953–1954.

The reason so many Hsin Hsing villagers must supplement their family income in Taipei is clear when one notes that the main livelihood of the local people is intensive agriculture, which furnishes only about 65 percent of the village income; the rest comes from nonagricultural sources, especially work in Taipei. There is not enough land available to the villagers to support the growing population.

According to the April, 1957, official records, ninety Hsin Hsing

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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According to the April 1957, official records, 96 ninety Hsin Hsing

311 village farm families cultivated 61.74 *chia* (147.6 acres) of arable land
• 423 as owners and/or tenants.[13] Of this total, 16.29 *chia* (38.9 acres) were
423 still held by thirty-eight families as tenant land. The average amount
of arable land cultivated per household was 0.68 *chia* (1.6 acres).[14]

Because of the limited amount of land available, most villagers who want to buy or rent land for cultivation cannot be too particular [493] about its location. They are usually willing to acquire any piece of land, so long as it is in the general area and can be conveniently reached by bicycle. Thus a villager's land usually consists of several tiny plots scattered throughout the surrounding countryside. On the average, the size of the separate plot is well under 0.5 *chia* (0.7 acres), which means that villagers must spend much of their time shuttling [492] back and forth among their scattered small fields. If the fieldwork [407] demands only a few light tools, the trip by bicycle is fast enough, but if it requires a water buffalo and heavy equipment like a plow, the trip from field to field takes a great deal of time. However, having the plots scattered this way can also be an advantage: all the land cultivated by [312] one villager is not necessarily dependent upon the same irrigation ditch or even perhaps the same irrigation network. Thus a shortage of water in one waterway need not effect all of a farmer's holdings.

311 Many of the fields cultivated by Hsin Hsing villagers are almost two
423 miles away, on the far side of the two neighboring villages Ta Yu and
427 Yung P'ing. For example, in the Yung P'ing area where Hsin Hsing
628 villagers rent or own much land, the fields are cultivated by farmers from at least three different villages. One field may be adjoined on three sides by fields owned or held by farmers from Ta Yu, Yung P'ing, or Hsin Hsing. This, of course, means these villagers will have some relationship with each other, especially if the fields are irrigated. (See Land Tenure Map, Chapter 4, for details.) The proximity of fields held by men from different villages is especially common in the area around Hsin Hsing, since the villages here are so close together that there is not very much open land between them. There are also a number of Hsin Hsing-owned wet fields beyond the two-mile range of the village, which are therefore not shown on the land map. In fact, a few villagers cultivate relatively large plots of dry land almost six miles from the village, since these crops do not usually need constant attention. In these cases the land is either tenant land still owned by public enterprises or is formerly land publicly or privately owned sold to the tenant under the Land Reform Acts of 1951–1952. The Hsin Hsing villagers originally rented these lands after the last war, when the competition for land was at its height.

423 These fragmented and scattered landholdings result from several
428 factors. The insufficiency of land caused villagers to buy or rent land
[427] wherever it was available. In addition, the system of inheritance of

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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landownership rights as well as the types of ownership patterns in Taiwan tend to foster such fragmentation and scattering of landholdings. The ownership of land is for the most part inherited in equal shares by the family's sons, including any son or sons by adoption. Although by law daughters may also inherit land, since they are usually married out of the family they do not participate in the inheritance.

All of the land owned by villagers comes under the official heading of privately owned land. Land can be owned by individuals or families under individual or joint ownership. Individual-ownership land is a piece of surveyed land which is owned and registered in the name of a single owner. Joint-ownership land is land surveyed as a single field and recorded in the name of one representative owner which is actually owned jointly by a number of people; each of the joint owners owns a portion of the surveyed field and cultivates his plot separately. The third kind of private-ownership land is corporate land. There are only a few relatively insignificant instances in Hsin Hsing of village patrilineal kinship groups (*tsu*) owning corporate land. In each case the landholding is small and is recorded in the name of the eldest *tsu* male—who in some instances has long since died. Most often *tsu* land is leased—usually on a rotation basis—to *tsu* family members. The rent paid is used to finance *tsu* functions such as the upkeep of the *tsu*'s main ancestral-worship room (no Hsin Hsing village *tsu* has an ancestral temple) and sometimes the expenses of ancestral worship. The land reform law has technically eliminated the category of such *tsu* or corporate landholdings.

Neither the earlier Japanese nor the present land tenure system permits subtenants in Taiwan; there is no such concept of ownership or tenancy of "subsoil" or "land surface" as was found to exist in many instances on the mainland (as discussed in Fei, 1939:174–196). According to both the law or official records and the villagers' concept of land tenure, a family—usually under the name of its senior male member—owns land. The land may be cultivated by that family itself or, for various reasons, leased to a tenant. The tenant cultivates the land and pays a predetermined rent—usually in kind—to the landlord. Until the 1949–1953 Land Reform Acts, tenants had no rights on the land except those granted by the landlord. Land reform has radically changed this. Today tenants and their families have certain rights on the land they cultivate and therefore a greater degree of security.

In spite of the pressures of the constantly increasing population on the land, there has been little development of any kind of important local industry. Except in some scattered brickworks and menthol-distilling factories in the area, there is little demand for the labor of

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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464 villagers who hold too little land to support their families.[18] Some village men peddle vegetables during the slack agricultural seasons or find some other seasonal work, but there is no real solution to the 464 economic problem. Since Lukang offers few job opportunities for vil- 167 lage people, the only alternative is for the village's [redacted]rplus to 423 move on to Taipei to find work. While the move to Taipei for most [434] village men is merely a temporary migration to supplement family [427] income, some establish themselves in the city and move their entire families there. Those who still have a small piece of land in the village area then usually rent it out, or ask someone else to cultivate it for them. The owner thus gains some economic security by retaining title to the land; very few people will sell their land outright.

DIET AND NUTRITION

433 The Hsin Hsing villager is far from self-sufficient, either for food 261 or other needs. After the harvest the villager consumes his own vegeta- 432 bles, rice, and sweet potatoes, but during the course of the year, he [439] must buy a great part of his staple food. Vegetables, additional rice, [443] pork, fish, salt, tea, sugar, sesame seed oil, peanut oil, lard, and any number of other items are purchased either in Lukang or from itinerant merchants. Additional necessary annual purchases like clothing, tools, and other necessities, almost none of which are produced by the villagers themselves, show how dependent the villager is on the outside world.

262 The diet of the Hsin Hsing villager, except perhaps for the most poverty-stricken, depends more on occasion than perhaps anything else. The foods eaten at daily mealtimes are usually quite simple and 262 inexpensive, and thrift dominates these ordinary meals. However, on 574 special religious or other festive occasions when it is necessary to feed 577 guests, thrifty regard for the kinds and quantities of food served becomes the least important factor. A villager invites criticism from his fellows if he is not thrifty in his everyday eating and living habits, but the man who exercises thrift on a festive occasion when outside guests are present usually earns the reputation of being "stingy."

241 An additional determinant of diet is the phase of the agricultural 262 cycle. During the harvest season, for example, it is customary for every- 264 one engaged in the heavy work to eat five meals a day. The meal at the end of the day's work is particularly elaborate and nutritious. A 577 man may also earn himself the reputation of being stingy if, for example, he is frugal with respect to the food he serves his field laborers at harvesttime. Word of his stinginess spreads quickly, and such a farmer 000 may find it difficult to obtain field labor at future harvesttimes. The

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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The Land and the Agricultural Process

To understand present-day life in Hsin Hsing, it seems fruitful to look first at the nature of village livelihood and recent changes in it. By examining the nature of the economic change and especially its consequences—for example, the ways in which the villager, in order to improve or at least maintain his livelihood, has become increasingly involved in complex relationships beyond the village limits—we will be better able to understand the changes in other areas of life, such as social organization, village leadership and cooperation, family and kinship, and life history and religion. It will be seen in the following chapters that the changes produced in these other aspects tend to reinforce the processes of change in the economy, and hence in the village generally.

Agriculture and the land-man relationship have always been the basis of the livelihood of Hsin Hsing villagers. The major part of village income, in fact, still comes from sources related to the land. But the land resources, both in quantity and productive capacity (as already briefly noted in Chapter 2 in the section on population and its economic base), have not kept pace with the natural population increase. And yet, from all available evidence, in spite of the imbalance between agricultural income and productivity and natural population growth, the village income and standard of living have risen.

While this is important, our main concerns in Chapters 3 and 4 will be the nature of the economic organization in Hsin Hsing village, the developments which have brought about changes in the area, and how these have enabled the villagers to deal with the imbalance of land productivity to population.

Two major developments have affected Hsin Hsing and many surrounding villages as well: one is the effort, by government and villagers, to improve agricultural methods and the land tenure system so as to increase productivity and support more people; the other is the

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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[423] apparently ever-increasing tendency of the villagers to turn from their [242] traditional land-based economic pattern to other sources of income. [167] This has mainly taken the form of migration from the village to urban [621] centers. We shall see that these developments have affected both livelihood and standard of living in Hsin Hsing. But we shall also see, [628] especially later, that they have produced changes in social and political patterns as well and that all the developments have, by mutual [602] reinforcement, affected village life by weakening community organization and solidarity, thus broadening the emphasis of village relationships beyond village, area, and kinship group.

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175 In Chapter 2 we saw that in the nineteenth and early twentieth
161 centuries the local population was relatively small. Dry cultivation was
241 practiced in the area until the present expanded irrigation system was
433 created. Agricultural production per unit of dry land had been low,
464 and required so many man-hours that villagers preferred to supple-
[434] ment their family income with other forms of labor if available. In that period the port city of Lukang was an important outlet for local village labor. Fortunately, soon after the demise of the port, irrigation facilities in the area expanded rapidly, and thus agriculture—mainly wet-rice—successfully absorbed much of the village labor as production increased. Middle-aged villagers report that thirty-five years ago, when they were boys, most of the villagers grew rice in wet fields.

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241 For more than twenty years in the Hsin Hsing area, farmers have
312 cultivated three crops a year on their irrigated and dry land. The irrigated crops are the more important, since irrigated land comprises 93.3 percent of the cultivable acreage. Depending on the amount of water available for irrigation at the appropriate time, the farmers devote the first two of the annual crops to rice; if the water supply is insufficient, they plant other crops instead. The third is a winter crop, when there is no water for irrigation. The farmers may use all the cultivable land for it.

The first two crops of the year are usually wet-rice which is grown, naturally, on the irrigated land. The growing season for the two rice crops covers the period from early February to early November. Since the villagers' land is scattered throughout the area and irrigation schedules vary from one place to another, there is a resulting difference

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[433] in rice-planting times for the Hsin Hsing farmers. The yield of the first crop may exceed that of the second by as much as 25 percent, because of the difference in season and available irrigation water between the two growing periods.

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243 There are two major types of rice grown in Taiwan; their periods of maturation are slightly different. One type is the native *tsai lai* rice, and the other is *p'eng lai* rice, introduced into Taiwan by the Japanese. *P'eng lai* rice generally brings a better market price, but the type grown depends mainly on the type of soil in the field.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

A group of ten laborers works in the field as a unit, usually taking turns at the different tasks. Four laborers will cut the rice while four others collect it and thresh it in the rotary foot-pedal threshing machine. (This machine was introduced by the Japanese in the 1930's, and is now found throughout the area.) The machine is sometimes owned by the land operator but is often either borrowed or rented. While the eight laborers are cutting and threshing, another laborer binds up the threshed rice straw, leaving it in bundles across the field. Still another laborer separates the rice from the straw in the box of the machine and puts the threshed rice into baskets, which are later carried to the farmer's house for drying, winnowing, and storing. The straw bundles are later collected and put in big stacks near the farmer's house. The straw is gradually used for fuel, compost, and animal bedding.

The harvested rice is then used to pay taxes and rent and for fertilizer or for human and animal (fowl) consumption. The surplus may be sold either to an itinerant broker or one in Lukang. The rice which is eaten or sold to brokers is milled locally. One *chia* of land in the first crop produces about 7,000 to 8,000 *chin* of *tsai lai* rice, or about 10,000 *chin* of *p'eng lai* rice. (One *chin* is equivalent to one and one-third pounds.)

However, the landholdings in Hsin Hsing are small, and it is fairly common for more than 50 percent of the village farmers not to realize any cash for the crop. The greater part of the rice crop in general, even in areas with larger landholdings, is used by the farmer to feed his family and to pay various operating expenses. These operating expenses include, beyond labor costs, the payment of taxes, land payments either to the government—if the land was purchased under the Land Reform Acts—or rent to a private landlord, and payment for fertilizer. (The payment of these expenses in kind creates a problem which will be discussed in some detail later in this chapter.)

If the third crop is wheat, it is planted immediately after the second crop, anytime from late October to early or even mid-December. Wheat in Hsin Hsing is harvested from mid-February to mid-March, depending on when it was planted. It is harvested by hand, the plant being pulled up root and all. It is threshed in the same machine used for rice and then completely dried in the sun. Usually, a broker comes to the village soon after the harvest to buy the farmers' wheat. Although the price for a *chin* of wheat is higher than for a *chin* of rice, one *chia* of land can produce less than half the amount of wheat than it can of rice. (One *chia* of land produces about 3,000–4,000 *chin* of wheat.) In the past the crops have often been plagued by a wheat disease, and for this reason many farmers still do not like to grow wheat.

In the Hsin Hsing area sweet potatoes are the principal dry-land

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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villagers in premodern Taiwan also had relationships with other villages and areas, it is evident that the recent expansion of agriculture has made the increase in their outside relations both possible and necessary. During a period of drought while I was in the village, I found the villagers both aware and concerned with whether the provincial government would hold the large mountain water resources back in order to generate electric power or would release the water earlier to be used for irrigation.

The effect that irrigation has had on the villagers' outside concerns is no different from the effect on their lives of the recently expanded operations of the Farmers' Association through its facilities and, especially, its improved extension services.

But perhaps one of the most striking changes in the village has been in land utilization—the important switch to vegetable growing, a cash crop, which necessitates a development of interest in marketing. This change in land utilization is very closely related to land tenure problems such as land scarcity and the recent important development of out-migration of villagers to the city. These will be discussed in the next chapter.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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ownership became even more concentrated in the postwar period than in the pre-war period" (Klein, 1958:53). Large numbers of tenants and would-be tenants were in continuing competition for the land they needed to support their families. The competition, unfortunately, tended to put the tenants at the landlords' mercy and helped perpetuate the already unsatisfactory land tenure system.

Klein also points out that the "increased demand for food by urban dwellers and for rural land by farmers, resulted in the many abuses practiced by rural landowners becoming qualitatively worse and quantitatively more numerous than before. One of the notorious abuses was that of charging oppressively heavy rents" (1958:53). From "1945 through 1947, rents of 60 per cent and 70 per cent (of the annual main crop) became not uncommon in the more fertile and densely populated areas. In some areas the rent was 'ironclad' which meant that in the event of crop disaster or failure, the rent, determined as a percentage of the normal or expected yield was to be paid in full anyway" (Klein, 1958:53–54).

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The high rental rates in the moderately fertile Hsin Hsing village area seem to have been standardized according to the type and quality (grade) of the land being rented, and were, in addition, influenced by the relationship between the particular landlord and tenant. Hsin Hsing villagers imply that land rents before the Land Reform Reduction Law were no higher than they are today. Their most vivid memory is one of insecurity on the land rather than excessive rents. Many seem to have forgotten how bad the rent situation really was. Former landlords, however, admit almost nostalgically that land rents in this area were as high as 60 percent of the annual main crop. But the landlord paid all the taxes, and he and the tenant shared the expense of the fertilizer. The tenant paid all the labor costs.

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Everyone agrees that rent was generally paid in kind, seldom in money, and "the landlord, as a rule, charged the tenant a fixed amount of rice for paddy land regardless of how small a crop the tenant might raise or what crop he planted" (Chang, 1954:10–11). Nevertheless, if the tenant, through his own efforts, increased the production of his rented land, he usually had to pay a larger rent. There is no question that this greatly stifled the tenants' incentive to increase production. The payment of rent in kind—in rice for paddy land—meant that "In case the tenant planted crops other than rice, he had to sell his crops and buy rice from [the] market to meet the charge. The buying and selling of crops meant extra losses to the tenant" (Chang, 1954:11).

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There is no indication before 1949 in the Hsin Hsing area that the landlord collected rent in advance. Usually, he took 60 percent of the rent immediately after the first crop was harvested and the remaining

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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423 427 671 The law provided for a ceiling on farm rental of 37.5 percent of a predetermined estimated yield, regardless of any production above that figure. In the event of a crop failure, the law stipulated that "the lessee and the lessor may make arrangements between themselves for the reduction of rent in accordance with local custom. . . . If the total yield is less than 20 per cent of the normal yield, the entire rent payment shall be remitted" (T'ang, 1954:222). It guaranteed, through landlord-tenant contracts, that the rights and welfare of the tenant farmer would be safeguarded. However, there was still "no adequate provision for the protection of tenant's rights owing to the restrictions imposed by certain articles of the Land Law and the Civil Code. Hence there occurred, after the enforcement of farm rent reductions, many cases in which some landlords tried to take back their leased land from their tenants by resorting either to compulsion or promises of material benefit" (T'ang, 1954:32).

T 423 429 Loopholes in the law made it possible for landlords to make up for having to reduce the land rent by charging house rent and other new charges. In 1949 there were several cases of landlords who successfully convinced their gullible, or perhaps trusting, Hsin Hsing village tenants that there was no reason to draw up a land contract, since their verbal agreement had always been adequate in the past. On this basis, the landlord promised, the tenant "could consider that his family would be able to work the land forever on the same basis of mutual trust and good *kan-ch'ing* which had always existed between them." The rent would, of course, be the legal 37.5 percent paid by other tenants.

In several instances in Hsin Hsing and in other villages—according to an informant who works in the Public Office and used to have a position in the Land Office—uneducated tenants were persuaded not to report themselves as tenants. In these cases, since there was no one claiming tenancy rights, the landlord would say that he himself tilled this land. If later the rightful tenant should dispute the matter (and there have been a number of such cases), the landlord would officially claim that the tenant was not a tenant at all but only a hired laborer. In this way, the landlord, who realized there was to be a transfer of land to the tenants, felt he had a better chance to retain ownership of his land. In Hsin Hsing village, there are still a few small plots of land covered by such a verbal agreement between a landlord and his tenant.

Farm Rent Reduction Act of 1951

Tn 423 671 The many instances of landlords' abuses of tenants plus the weak enforcement of the 1949 provincial law led to a need for the "Farm Rent Reduction to 37.5 Percent Act." This national act was passed by

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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Taiwan AD6

the Legislative Yuan on May 25, 1951, and promulgated by the President of the Republic of China on June 7, 1951. Although it did not eliminate all abuses of tenants, it went a long way toward this end in the Hsin Hsing area as in all of Taiwan.

The act strictly enforced the rent reduction policy, holding land rent to 37.5 percent of the main annual crop. Production was predetermined on the basis of two crops a year in the Hsin Hsing area. Under its provisions any increase in production brought about through the tenant's own efforts benefited the tenant only, not the landlord. The rent was still to be paid in kind and in two installments, one after each harvest. The act also contained rules for rent reductions in cases of crop failure, specifying that the "Farm Tenancy Committees" of the area should investigate each case, determine the extent of the crop failure, and stipulate the amount by which the rent should be reduced. "If, owing to crop failure, the total yield is less than 30 per cent of the normal yield, the entire rent payment shall be remitted" (T'ang, 1954:225).

More important, the 1951 act provided security never before known by the Taiwanese tenant farmer. The tenant's right to work the rented land without fear of being evicted by the landlord was secured by a minimum six-year contract. The law even provided that when the six-year lease expired, the landlord could not take back the land for self-cultivation if he could not cultivate it himself, if his income was already sufficient to support his family, or if the tenant and his family, by loss of the leased land, would lose their means of livelihood (Chang, 1954:22–23).

With the tenant's security on the land protected, he no longer had to kowtow to his landlord or attempt to maintain good *kan-ch'ing*. Today, it is common to hear a tenant, formerly courteous to his landlord whether he liked him or not, actually curse him when he comes in his own wagon to collect and load the tenant's land rent. (The tenant formerly delivered the rent to the landlord.) On one such occasion in Hsin Hsing, K'ang, a landlord from another village, came to pick up his rice rent. In Mandarin, the name is pronounced K'ang, but in the local Taiwanese dialect, it is pronounced K'ung. But *K'ung* in Taiwanese also means stupid. The Hsin Hsing tenant, while watching the landlord load the rice in his wagon, laughingly repeated over and over for all to hear, "K'ung K'ung is here for the rent." It was obvious to everyone including the landlord that the tenant was punning on his name. While the others stood around and laughed, the landlord continued his work without a word.

The 1951 act also eliminated many other abuses of tenants by landlords. The landlord could be imprisoned if he forced the tenant by duress or force to give up the land. Collecting farm rent or deposit

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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ments to the government; the amount of these payments did not exceed the 25 percent of the crop paid in rent, but as an owner, the farmer was responsible for taxes and other charges. The financial benefits of ownership would thus not accrue to the new owner until the entire purchase price was paid off in ten years. The sale was important and contributed to the landownership of a few former tenant families in Hsin Hsing. However, it was far less important and attracted less interest than the Land-to-the-Tiller Act which went into effect in 1953 (Chang, 1954: 60–61).

The Land-to-the-Tiller Act of 1953

Under the act, the government was given authority to expropriate the land of landlords and to create owner-farmers. Basically, it provided for government purchase of certain tenant-cultivated lands for the purpose of resale to the tenant-cultivators. In the Hsin Hsing village area, where most of the land is of medium grade, most landlords could retain a maximum of three *chia* (7.2 acres) of paddy land or six *chia* (14.4 acres) of dry (nonirrigated) land. The purchase price of the expropriated land was "fixed at 250 per cent of the total annual main crop yield (the standard volume of main crop as stated in the earlier 37.5 per cent rent contract). Of the purchase price, 70 per cent paid to the landlord is in land bonds and 30 per cent in government enterprise stockshares" (Chang, 1954:65).

The government's "resale price" of the land to the former tenant "is the same as the purchase price, plus a 4 per cent interest per annum and is to be amortized by the purchaser in ten equal annual installments" (Chang, 1954:65–66). Former tenants make a total of twenty semiannual payments, one after each harvest. The payments can be in rice for paddy land, or in cash for dry land, based on the current value of sweet potatoes. According to the law, "the average annual burden to be borne by the purchaser shall not exceed the burden on the same grade of land presently borne by the tenant farmer under the 37.5 per cent rent reduction program" (T'ang, 1954:190).

There was a general restriction written into the Land-to-the-Tiller Act to prevent the reaccumulation of land by large landholders or the manipulation and shifting of ownership of land reform land. It stipulates that "any purchaser who has acquired land under this Act shall not transfer the land to any other person before the purchase price is fully paid; transfer of land, after its purchase price is fully paid, shall be permitted only when the transferee can till the land himself or can use it for industrial purposes" (T'ang, 1954:191, translation of the Law, Chapter IV, Article 28). This means that technically there is no limitation on the amount of land that may be purchased and accumulated, except that the purchaser must have the ability to cultivate it.

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However, there is always the possibility that there might again be an expropriation of land in excess of three *chia* of paddy. Under this same section, there is a provision that "In the event that the purchaser cannot till the land himself before its purchase price is fully paid, he may request the Government to purchase the land for resale to other farmers. The Government shall, in such case, reimburse to the purchaser in one lump sum the purchase price already paid" (T'ang, 1954: 191; the Law, Chapter IV, Article 29).

According to Article 8, tenant-cultivated land to be purchased by the government for resale to the present tiller or tillers falls into seven categories: (1) land owned by landlord in excess of the permitted retention acreage; (2) land under joint ownership (no matter how small the amount); (3) the private portion of any land owned jointly by private individuals and the government; (4) land under government trusteeship; (5) land owned by private individuals or family clans for purposes of ancestral worship and land owned by religious institutions; (6) land owned by the Shenming Hui (a popular religious association in Taiwan) and land owned by other juristic persons and corporate bodies; and (7) land which the landlord does not wish to retain and requests the government to purchase (T'ang, 1954:186; "the Law" Chapter II, Article 8).

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LAND TENURE STATISTICAL DATA FOR HSIN HSING VILLAGE

Analysis of the land tenure records covering the present period for Hsin Hsing and other villages of the area provides a fairly complete picture of the land tenure situation of the post-land reform period.[1] However, to obtain a similar picture of land tenure immediately before the inception of the Land Reform Program, it is necessary to work backwards, using the records of the post-reform period as a basis, plus those few pre-reform records which are available. One such pre-land reform record is the 1949 list of landlord-tenant contracts for Hsin Hsing village. Land tenure figures can be calculated from this list of contracts; these, not entirely accurate, still present a picture of the pre-1953 situation, which is valuable for comparative purposes.

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Prior to the Land Reform Program (see Table 15) there were 92 farming families in over 100 households in Hsin Hsing village. These cultivated about 61.5580 *chia* of land (148 acres). Of this amount, 25.8204 *chia* (63 acres) was privately owned by Hsin Hsing villagers and 35.7376 *chia* (85 acres) was leased. House lands and roads, then as today, made up an additional 2.9909 *chia* (7 acres) of uncultivated land owned by Hsin Hsing residents. (In the following pages this

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

(In the following pages this uncultivated land will not be considered, since we are concerned only with productive land.)

Neither the total amount of land cultivated by Hsin Hsing villagers nor the actual number of farming families changed significantly as a result of the land reform. Nevertheless, there were striking internal

TABLE 13

BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL LAND CULTIVATED (OWNED AND OPERATED) AND NUMBER OF FAMILIES IN EACH CATEGORY IN HSIN HSING VILLAGE FOR PRE-LAND REFORM (1949–1951) AND POST-LAND REFORM (1957)

Land classification	1949–1951		1957	
	Area *chia*	Number of families	Area *chia*	Number of families
Privately owned (individual, joint, corporate)	25.8204	62	29.5567	62
Land reform land	—	—	15.3716	36
Tenanted land	35.7376	58	16.2925	38
Total number of farming families	—	92	—	90
Total land surface cultivated	61.5580	—	61.2208	—
House and other uncultivated lands	2.9909	—	2.9909	—
Total land surface owned and operated, cultivated and uncultivated	64.5489	—	64.2117	—

changes in the land tenure situation in the village, especially after the Land-to-the-Tiller Act of 1953, which greatly affected the figures on landownership and tenancy. Privately owned land rose to 29.5567 *chia* (71 acres), and an additional 15.3716 *chia* (37 acres) of leased land sold to the former tenants under the 1953 act caused tenancy to decline to 16.2925 *chia* (39 acres).[3]

EFFECTS OF THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM

The 61.5580 *chia* of land cultivated by Hsin Hsing villagers at the time of the 1949 "Regulations Governing the Lease of Private Farm Lands in Taiwan Province" was of two types: leased land and privately owned land. (See Tables 13 and 14.) Of this, 35.7376 *chia*, or 58.1 percent of the total, was rented by fifty-eight Hsin Hsing village households. Actually, there were a few more tenants, working a few very small plots of land, who were not recorded or given contracts in 1949. These few had been persuaded by their landlords to allow themselves to be classed as laborers instead of tenants. The remaining

[text continues on p. 101 -- Analyst]



Map 1. Land tenure map for Hsin Hsing village. Data from Lukang Land Office and Pu Yen Hsiang Public Office Land Section. Data as of 1957 except for land tenancy, which is as of August, 1958.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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25.8204 *chia* of cultivated land was privately owned by Hsin Hsing villagers under individual, joint, or corporate ownership. The largest part of all cultivated land was paddy land. (See Table 14.)

Most of the leased land in 1949 was owned by 25 different private landlords. A small part belonged to publicly owned enterprises. Of these twenty-five private landlords, only two were Hsin Hsing villagers; they owned about 5.2 *chia* of land or about 14.6 percent of the total leased land—almost all of which they rented out to fellow villagers. (See Table 15.) Of the remaining leaseholds, 28.5

TABLE 14

AREA AND TYPES OF LAND CULTIVATED BY 92 HSIN HSING HOUSEHOLDS BEFORE LAND REFORM, 1951

Land type	Paddy field	Dry field	Total (*chia*)	Percentage (*chia*)
Owner-cultivated	25.4867	0.3337	25.8204	41.9
Tenanted	31.9950	3.7426	35.7376	58.1
Totals	57.4817	4.0763	61.5580	100.0

TABLE 15

OWNERSHIP OF HSIN HSING VILLAGE TENANTED LAND, 1949–1951

	Total number of *chia* Hsin Hsing tenanted land	Hsin Hsing tenanted land owned by Hsin Hsing landlords	Hsin Hsing tenanted land owned by private outside landlords [a]	Hsin Hsing tenanted land owned by public enterprises
Amount of tenant land	35.7	5.2	28.5	2.0
Percent of tenant land	100.0	14.6	79.8	5.6
Number of private landlords	25.0	2.0	23.0	—

[a] Landlords living outside Hsin Hsing village as well as outside the area.

chia or 79.8 percent of the total was owned by 23 private outside landlords. Thirteen of them, owning over 19 *chia* of this land, lived in the two villages adjacent to Hsin Hsing, Ta Yu and Yung P'ing. The other ten, owning 9 *chia*, lived in more distant villages or in the cities and had little direct contact with their Hsin Hsing tenants. The remaining two *chia* of tenant land was public land, owned by public enterprises such as the Taiwan Sugar Corporation.

By 1954, the three-step program of land reform had been completed, and the almost 36 *chia* of leased land that had been cultivated by Hsin

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

Hsing villagers had been reduced to slightly over 16 *chia*. Almost 4 *chia* of the privately owned portion of tenant land had been sold by the owners to their Hsin Hsing tenants after the 1951 Rent Reduction Act (and before the 1953 act of expropriation). More than 2 *chia* of public land, eight plots rented to four Hsin Hsing villagers, were made available to these farmers for purchase over a ten-year period by virtue of the 1951 Land Act which governed the sale of public farmlands. And in 1953, under the Land-to-the-Tiller Act, the government purchased an additional 13.5 *chia* (in forty-six plots) of privately

TABLE 16

AREAS AND TYPES OF LAND CULTIVATED BY 90 HSIN HSING HOUSEHOLDS AFTER LAND REFORM, 1957

	Paddy field	Dry field	Total (*chia*)	Percent (*chia*)
Owner-cultivated	42.2345	2.6958	44.9283	73.4
Tenanted	14.9100	1.3825	16.2925	26.6
Total	57.1445	4.0763	61.2208	100.0
Percentage	93.3	6.7	—	—

TABLE 17

AREAS OF CULTIVATED LANDS IN HSIN HSING VILLAGE BEFORE AND AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF LAND-TO-THE-TILLER PROGRAM

	Before implementation		After implementation (1957 records)	
	Area (*chia*)	Percent	Area (*chia*)	Percent
Owner-cultivated	25.8	41.9	44.9	73.4
Tenanted	35.7	58.1	16.3	26.6
Total	61.5	100.0	61.2	100.0

owned Hsin Hsing tenant land from the landlords and made it available to the 33 former tenants for eventual ownership. One of these 33 families had also purchased public land under the 1951 act.

With the completion of the Land Reform Program of 1953, the land tenure picture for Hsin Hsing village had changed radically. According to the September, 1957, records, as a direct or indirect[8] result of the land reform, the amount of land leased by villagers was reduced by almost 55 percent from 35.7 *chia* of land in 1949 to 16.29 *chia* in 1957. Whereas in 1949 land leased by villagers had represented 58.1 percent of the total cultivated land, by 1957 it was reduced to 26.6 percent of the total. (See Tables 13, 14, 16, and 17.) (See Map 4 for distribution of village landholdings.)

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

Prior to land reform, 14.6 percent of the leased land in Hsin Hsing was owned by Hsin Hsing villagers and 85.4 percent by outsiders, including public enterprises. (See table 14.) After land reform, in 1957, only about 9.1 percent of the leased land was village owned; 90.9 percent was owned by outsiders. (See Table 18.)

TABLE 18

TENANTED LAND IN HSIN HSING VILLAGE, 1957

	Paddy (*chia*)	Dry (*chia*)	Total	Percent
Land surface tenanted	14.9100	1.3825	16.2925	100.0
Tenanted land owned by Hsin Hsing landlords	1.4753	—	1.4753	9.1
Tenanted land owned by landlords outside Hsin Hsing	13.4347	1.3825	14.8172	90.9

In the pre-land reform period (1949–1951), of the 92 farming households in Hsin Hsing village, 58 households (63.0 percent) were tenants, and of these 30 (or 32.6 percent of the village's farming households) owned no land whatsoever. (See Table 19.) In the post-land reform

TABLE 19

NUMBER OF FARMING FAMILIES IN HSIN HSING BY SIZE OF CULTIVATED LAND, 1951

Amount cultivated in *chia*	Own all land	Mixed owner-tenant owns more than half	Mixed owner-tenant owns less than half	Pure tenant	Total number of farming families	Percent of farming families
Less than 0.1	4	—	—	—	4	4.3
0.1–0.3	6	1	1	7	15	16.3
0.3–0.5	8	—	6	8	22	23.9
0.5–1.0	9	2	11	12	34	37.0
1.0–1.5	4	1	3	2	10	10.9
1.5–2.0	2	—	—	1	3	3.3
2.0–2.5	1	—	—	—	1	1.1
2.5–3.0	—	1	1	—	2	2.2
Over 3.0	—	1	—	—	1	1.1
Number of families	34	6	22	30	92	—
Percent of families	37.0	6.5	23.9	32.6	—	100.1

period, the 1957 records show ninety farming households listed in the village of whom only 38 (42.2 percent) were tenant households; of these only 9 (10 percent of the total number of farming households)

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

owned no land, while the remaining 29 tenant householders were partial landowners as a result of the Land Reform Acts. (See Table 20.)

TABLE 20

NUMBER OF FARMING FAMILIES IN HSIN HSING BY SIZE OF CULTIVATED LAND, 1957

Amount cultivated in *chia*	Own all land	Mixed owner-tenant owns more than half	Mixed owner-tenant owns less than half	Pure tenant	Total number of farming families	Percent of farming families
Less than 0.1	4	—	—	—	4	4.4
0.1–0.5	12	1	—	3	16	17.8
0.5–1.0	11	5	1	3	20	22.2
1.0–1.5	18	9	7	2	36	40.0
1.5–2.0	5	2	1	1	9	10.0
2.0–2.5	2	—	—	—	2	2.2
2.5–3.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Over 3.0	—	2	—	—	2	2.2
Number of families	—	1	—	—	1	1.1
Percent of families	52	20	9	9	90	—
	57.8	22.2	10.0	10.0	—	99.9

TABLE 21

AREA OF FARMS CULTIVATED BY 36 FARMERS WHO PURCHASED LAND THROUGH LAND REFORM, 1957

Kinds of farmland	Area in *chia*		Percent
Land purchased under Land-to-the-Tiller Program		15.3716	59.6
Paddy field	13.0115		—
Dry land	2.3601		—
Land originally owned and cultivated by farmers themselves		4.5224	17.5
Paddy field	4.4374		—
Dry land	0.0850		—
Leased land		5.8980	22.9
Paddy field	4.7665		—
Dry land	1.1315		—
Total area		25.7920	100.0
Paddy field	22.2154		86.1
Dry land	3.5766		13.9

The rest of the land worked in Hsin Hsing in the post-land reform period consisted of the already mentioned 15.3716 *chia* purchased either under the 1951 act for the sale of public land or the 1953 Land-to-the-Tiller Act, plus the 29.5567 *chia* owned by the villagers as indi-

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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vidual, joint, or corporate owned land. However, if one considers the 15.3716 *chia* of land which changed ownership under land reform as 423

TABLE 22

NUMBER OF FAMILIES PURCHASING LAND UNDER LAND-TO-THE-TILLER PROGRAM, AND AREA OF FARMS THEY CULTIVATE
Part A. Pre-Land Reform (1949–1951)

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Size of class (*chia*)	Number of farmers later to purchase land: Number of families	Percent	Area of farms cultivated (*chia*): Paddy field	Dry field	Total area	Percent
Landless: farmers owning no land	19	52.8	—	—	—	—
Less than 0.1 (*chia*)	4	11.1	—	0.0610	0.0610	1.3
0.1–0.5	7	19.4	1.0425	0.0240	1.0665	23.6
0.5–1.0	3	8.3	1.0784	—	1.0784	23.8
1.0–1.5	3	8.3	2.3165	—	2.3165	51.2
1.5–2.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
2.0–2.5	—	—	—	—	—	—
2.5–3.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Over 3.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	36	99.9	4.4574	0.0850	4.5224	99.9

TABLE 22

NUMBER OF FAMILIES PURCHASING LAND UNDER LAND-TO-THE-TILLER PROGRAM, AND AREA OF FARMS THEY CULTIVATE
Part B. Post-Land Reform (1957)

Size of class (*chia*)	Number of farmers to purchase land: Number of families	Percent	Area of farms cultivated including previously owned land (*chia*): Paddy field	Dry field	Total area	Percent
Landless: farmers owning no land	—	—	—	—	—	—
Less than 0.1 (*chia*)	2	5.5	0.3569	0.0130	0.3699	1.8
0.1–0.5	7	19.4	1.3773	0.2000	1.5573	8.2
0.5–1.0	10	27.8	3.6438	0.2482	3.8920	19.6
1.0–1.5	13	36.1	7.7481	0.5918	8.3399	41.9
1.5–2.0	3	8.3	3.5210	—	3.5210	17.7
2.0–2.5	—	—	—	—	—	—
2.5–3.0	1	2.8	0.8218	1.3321	2.1539	10.8
Over 3.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—	—	—	—
	36	99.9	17.4489	2.4451	19.8940	100.0

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5
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the equivalent of owner operated land (and legally this is how it is considered), then it is notable that of the 61.2208 *chia* operated by the villagers in 1957 44.9285 *chia*, or 73.4 percent, was privately owned and the remaining 26.6 percent tenant operated.

Thirty-six families, about 40 percent of the Hsin Hsing village farming families, were benefited by the Land-to-the-Tiller Act of 1953. Before the reform program, 19 of these 36 families owned no land at all, and their livelihood depended strictly on the land they rented and whatever outside income they had. However, the other 17 families, besides their rented land, owned only about 4.5 *chia* of land, most of which was paddy field. After the Land Reform Program, which affected almost 15.5 *chia* under the 1951–1953 acts, land that these 36 families cultivated as owners increased to 19.9 *chia*, of which about 17.5 *chia* was paddy. In 1957, 19 of these same 36 households continued to work a little below 6 *chia* of land as tenant farmers. (See Table 21.) This tenant land is cultivated under the strict enforcement of the 37.5 percent Rent Reduction Act.

The change in the landholding status of the 36 families directly affected by the reform program is shown in Table 22, Parts A and B. Before land reform only 3 of the 36 owned more than 0.5 *chia* of land, but in the post-land reform period, 17 of the 36 owned more than 0.5 *chia*. The average area purchased by Hsin Hsing tillers under the reform was 0.44 *chia*, usually in one and sometimes two plots of land per family. This means that in Hsin Hsing village, of the 54 plots of land sold to the tillers by the government, the size of the average plot sold was less than 0.5 *chia* of land.

Chang Yen-t'ien (1954:86) writes that in Taiwan about 46.44 percent of the total pre-reform tenants, including part-tenants, purchased land through the reform program. But he notes that "more than half of the former tenant families . . . are still entirely or partly under the influence of tenancy."

For Hsin Hsing village, the records show that 62 percent of the 58 pre-reform tenants purchased some land reform land, and the figure is probably this high because of the higher rate of tenancy in Hsin Hsing than in Taiwan as a whole. Thirty-six households, or 65.5 percent, of the 58 are still to some extent tenants, however. This is mainly because the land they rented happened to be part of the 3 *chia* of land the landlord could retain under the 1953 law. While this was true for landlords in all of Taiwan, the average land purchase figure may be larger for the whole of Taiwan than for Hsin Hsing because elsewhere in Taiwan there were large tracts of public land available for purchase and, in addition, at the time of the restoration there was little Japanese-cultivated land in the immediate area of Hsin Hsing for Hsin Hsing villagers to take over. These factors have gener-

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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ally contributed to a lower average amount of land tilled by owners in Hsin Hsing than in other villages and areas.

The two major improvements in the land tenure situation as seen in Tables 19, 20, and 23 are: first, the significant increase in landownership and decrease in tenancy, especially the decrease in the number of pure tenants; and second, the large increase in the number of Hsin Hsing mixed owner-tenants, who in 1957 owned more than half the land they cultivated.

It can also be seen from Table 23 that, in 1957, 70 of the 81 land-

TABLE 23

STATISTICS ON LANDOWNERSHIP CLASSIFICATION FOR HSIN HSING VILLAGE: PRE-LAND REFORM (1951–1952) AND POST-LAND REFORM (1957)

Size of class (*chia*)	1951–1952		1957	
	Number of farming households	Percent of households	Number of farming households	Percent of households
Own no land at all	30	32.6	9	10.0
Own less than 0.1	12	13.0	9	10.0
0.1–0.5	18	19.6	18	20.0
0.5–0.5	12	13.0	19	21.1
0.5–1.0	13	14.1	24	26.7
1.0–1.5	4	4.3	6	6.7
1.5–2.0	2	2.2	2	2.2
2.0–2.5	1	1.1	3	3.3
Total Landowners	62	67.3	81	90.0
Total farming households	92	99.9	90	100.0

holding families still owned less than one *chia* of land, and 46 of the 81 owned less than a half-*chia*. Thus, the land reform brought about virtually no increase in the total amount of land cultivated by Hsin Hsing villagers or increases in the number of families cultivating the land in each size category. While the reform produced important changes in the internal nature of the land tenure situation, it did not and could not solve the basic problem—an insufficiency of cultivable land coupled with rapid population growth.

Of the 115 households registered in the village in 1957, only 90 households can actually be considered farming families. The 25 registered households of Hsin Hsing village which do not cultivate land at all must be classed as village nonfarming, landless families. The breadwinner in such families may work locally as a hired farm laborer or may have gone off to work in Taipei because of the land scarcity. Once assured of an adequate living in the city, a few of such men sold off or gave up the very small portions of land they were cultivating. Once well settled in Taipei, a few brought at least part and sometimes

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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all of their families to live in the city, although they still maintained registration in the village. Others still maintain a household in the village, leaving an old mother or perhaps even a wife and daughters in the village house.

Other landless households consist of old people who, in the course of family division, left themselves landless by dividing their land among their sons. Such old people usually continue to live in their own house or apartment in the village and eat with their sons' families on a rotation basis.

In Hsin Hsing village there are many farming families who, like the landless, must engage in some form of supplementary activity to earn additional income. Of the 90 farming households, 40 cultivate less than 0.5 *chia* (1.2 acres) of land. (See Table 20.) Many of these families, and even some families which cultivate more than 0.5 *chia*, are too large for the income from so little land. To augment their income, some work as farm laborers and others as itinerant merchants, but most go to Taipei to seek work. In the near future the continued population increase and fractionalization of the land may force more and more of these families into the ranks of the landless.

Many of the benefits which should have resulted from the land reform—the rent reduction, the increased incentive to work the land, the increased crop production and the higher income from a greater application of fertilizer—are negated by a general rise in operating costs for the tiller. This is especially true for former tenants who bought land through the 1953 Land-to-the-Tiller Act; their annual payments on land purchased from the government come to a higher amount than would have been charged in rent (37.5 percent) for similar land. In addition, they now also bear all the operating costs on the land, which formerly were largely borne by the landlord. At the time of the research (1958) at least, this act in itself had not brought about any noteworthy increase in the standard of living.

Although the annual payments on the mortgage to the government do not exceed the 37.5 percent rent paid as tenants on private land or the 25 percent rent paid as tenants on the formerly public owned land, the financial burden is actually heavier than it was when the farmers were still tenants paying reduced rents. As Chang (1954:89–91) has pointed out,

> A new owner, so far as he has not fully paid the land price, is in fact a tenant. He has to assume a burden of duties and land price more than that of a bona fide tenant, and has to pay the operating expenses equal to those of a tenant, which are generally higher than those of owner-farmers. His income, too, like that of a tenant, is lower than that of owner-farmers. . . . The situation of new owners, within the coming ten years, will certainly be no better than that of tenants. But looking forward to [being a] full owner-farmer after ten years, when his burden will be only 14.82 percent of his

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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annual main crop, the new owner is mentally in a better situation, and socially he has climbed to the rank of owner-farmer.

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Often, villagers who have purchased land under the reform program do not really consider themselves its owners. Besides knowing that they are not yet reaping any increased income from the land, many have a "seeing is believing" attitude. They will believe that the government has made it possible for them to own the land when they no longer have to pay on the mortgage and when they earn an income from the land equivalent to what an owner-farmer earns. They recognize what the future may hold for them as "real owners," but, in the meantime, the burden is extremely heavy.

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Villagers who work outside Hsin Hsing have done more to raise the standard of living than has the decrease in tenancy. The increased use of cash has also led to an apparent rise in living standards. In Japanese times, villagers tended to save their money toward future land purchase. Today, people no longer save money for fear of inflation; instead, they are using their cash to purchase tangible goods—bicycles, more and better clothing, and so on, are increasingly in evidence in the rural area.

THE NATURE OF PRIVATE-OWNERSHIP LAND

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The 29.5567 *chia* of privately owned land in Hsin Hsing village falls into three categories: (1) individually owned, 35.3 percent of the total private land; (2) jointly owned, 61.5 percent of the total; and (3) corporate or community owned, only 3.2 percent of all the private land owned. (See Table 24.) This classification and the percentages for each type in Hsin Hsing approximate the situation in Taiwan as a whole (T'ang, 1954:98–107).

The system of individually owned land is rather simple, since it consists of portions of land legally owned by one individual who, in most cases, represents a family. On all land records this land is always listed in the name of that one owner. As can be seen in Table 24, very little of the land individually owned in Hsin Hsing is house or road land; it is almost all cultivated land.

Joint-ownership land in Taiwan is one of the most complex forms of private ownership to record and keep track of. It is a common phenomenon making up the largest percentage of the privately owned land in Hsin Hsing as well as in Taiwan. A plot of land is owned jointly by from two to hundreds of individuals. Each joint owner will own a portion of the plot—one-third, one-fifth, or one-twelfth, and so on. In many cases, in Hsin Hsing at least, the joint owners do not own equal shares. Each joint owner may work his share independently or in small groups according to family relationship.

Under the land reform record-keeping system, rather than register-

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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Taiwan AD6

ing each tiny share of land separately in its owner's name at the Land Office, "it was decided that all plots of land under joint ownership would be classified under the names of all the joint owners, and not under the names of each owner separately" (T'ang, 1954:100). By this system, then, the land was recorded as joint land under the name of one person who acted as legal representative for all the joint owners. Even in Japanese times the government did not interfere in this system, and the representative was supposed to see to the regular payment of the farmland tax for all the joint owners.

TABLE 24

AREA OF PRIVATE LAND UNDER INDIVIDUAL, JOINT, AND CORPORATE OWNERSHIP IN HSIN HSING VILLAGE, 1957

	Area in *chia* of cultivated land	Percent	Area in *chia* of house, land, and road	Percent	Total of each type of land area owned	Percent of total private land
Individual	11.1006	34.1	0.3946	1.2	11.4952	35.3
Joint	17.9196	55.1	2.0768	6.4	19.9964	61.5
Corporate	0.5365	1.6	0.5195	1.6	1.0560	3.2
Total	29.5567	90.9	2.9909	9.1	32.5476	100.0

Regarding the reasons for the existence for so much joint-ownership land in Taiwan, T'ang (1954:101–102) writes:

> The causes that have given rise to joint ownership are three; reclamation of land through common efforts in the early history of Taiwan; joint purchase of land; and inheritance of ancestral landed property by brothers. . . . The landowners themselves preferred joint to individual ownership in order to avoid the incidental troubles of subdivision, surveying, and the red tape of transfers. Under such circumstances, it frequently happened that a piece of land originally under individual ownership might come to be jointly owned when it was transferred or inherited; and that a piece of land originally under joint ownership might have a larger number of joint owners as time went on. The number of joint owners of a plot of land varies from three or five to scores or hundreds of persons. This state of affairs not only is a positive hindrance to cadastral management, but also obstructs land improvement and gives rise to innumerable disputes.

The forms that joint ownership take in Hsin Hsing seem to correlate with T'ang's explanation of the causes that have given rise to it. For example, most of the house land in Hsin Hsing is land jointly held among relatives. There are also instances in Hsin Hsing where the land is listed under the representative name of a Hsin Hsing villager, but the joint owners are farmers from neighboring villages as well as

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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from Hsin Hsing. The reason for such diversified joint-ownership groupings may very well go back to the initial period of settlement in the area. 423

However, the most common type of joint ownership in Hsin Hsing is holdings of groups of cousins or brothers. Inheritance of family land is generally the reason for such ownership groupings. Usually, cousins who are joint owners are members of separate households. The land originally belonged to their fathers as joint land, or to their paternal grandfather, or perhaps to some even more distant relative. 423 593 605 [428]

On the other hand, the situation varies when the joint owners are brothers. If family division has already taken place, then each brother will cultivate his share of the land independently. If division has not occurred, the brothers work the whole plot as a common unit, just as they manage all of the economic affairs of such a household. Sometimes brothers may have recently inherited the joint shares from their father. In other cases, the brothers may have recently purchased the land as joint-ownership land. Some have officially listed the exact share of each brother to eliminate any problems or disputes over the land when the family divides. 423 593

The joint ownership of land became a serious disadvantage for some farmers as a result of the Land-to-the-Tiller Act of 1953. Owners of joint-ownership portions of land are really no different from the owners of individually owned plots. However, according to the reform act of 1953 (T'ang, 1954:186, Chapter II, Article 8), any joint-ownership land which is not tilled by the owner but is rented out instead, and is not owned by certain specified helpless people, e.g., the old, the infirm, orphans, is liable for expropriation by the government or purchase by the tenant. This singling out of joint-ownership land was done by the government in an attempt to do away with this very common but administratively complex type of ownership which is "primitive and confused" (Chang, 1954:80). While individually owned land could be retained by the noncultivating landlord in amounts up to three *chia* (if medium-grade land), the law did not provide for retention of any portion by joint owners of land. 423 656

As a result of this purely technical difference, the law has worked a hardship on many owners who owned small shares of joint-ownership land which they rented out. One such example in Hsin Hsing village was a man who owned a few small portions of joint-ownership land. Since he held an outside job, his family worked one of the small plots and rented out the other; the income contributed to their livelihood. This rented-out land, on which a share of the family's income depended, was expropriated by the government.

Corporate or community-ownership land is the third type of private-ownership land. In Hsin Hsing village, as in most villages in Taiwan, 423 618

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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this type of landholding belongs to a *tsu* group. The *tsu* may be a very large one which dominates a whole village, as in many Taiwanese villages, or it may be one of many small *tsu* groups in a village such as Hsin Hsing. In Hsin Hsing only a few of the *tsu* groups own such land, which represents only 3.2 percent of the total land owned by Hsin Hsing villagers. Almost half of this corporate land is the house land for *tsu* members. Almost all of the cultivated corporate land, about 0.5 *chia*, belongs to one of the larger *tsu* in Hsin Hsing, the K'angs. Most of their land is unofficially rented out to two of the *tsu's* own members, who then pay rent of 37.5 percent to the *tsu*. The money is used for some of the *tsu* expenses such as religious ceremonials or the repair of the *tsu's* main ancestral-worship room.

In the official land tenure records, the corporate land is listed in the name of some members of the *tsu* group; it is not recorded as rented-out land. In the several cases of corporate landholdings in Hsin Hsing, the *tsu* members listed as owners in the records are long since deceased, but their names are still carried in the books. The cultivated portions of the corporate lands are administered by respected *tsu* elders. Generally, in Hsin Hsing the *tsu* group pays little concern to its corporate lands, since the amount of them is actually insignificant.[4]

LAND REFORM AND THE LANDLORD

The government compensated landlords for lands expropriated in 1953, but because of the unstable economic situation the compensation was not in cash; 70 percent was paid in land bonds and 30 percent in Government Enterprise Stockshares. In order to insure the value of the bonds against the fluctuations in currency values, they were issued to the former landlords on a commodity basis and, at maturity, were to be paid in kind instead of in cash. Rice was to be paid in return for expropriated paddy land and sweet potatoes for dry land. The principal and interest at 4 percent per annum on the land bonds are being paid to the former landlords over a ten-year period in twenty equal semiannual installments (a payment schedule notably similar to that made by the purchasers of the land from the government). The land bonds are transferable and can be sold on the open market or used as security in financial matters (Chang, 1954:76–77; T'ang, 1954:147–151; 154–163).

After the restoration the national and provincial governments owned 70 percent of the industrial enterprises in Taiwan. These had been taken over from the Japanese at the end of the war. At that time, it was the desire of the Nationalist Chinese government to transfer all public enterprises to private owners except those relating to national defense, those of a monopolistic nature, and those affecting utilities.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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For the most part this was achieved after 1953 by transferring the stockshares of such enterprises as paper, mining, and cement to former landlords in payment for their government-purchased land (Chang, 1954:77–79; T'ang, 1954:164–173). But it was clear from the outset that some of these enterprises were less profitable than others and, as far as the landlords were concerned, less acceptable (Chang, 1954:79). Although it was common knowledge that many of the stockshares they received were not worth face value, the landlords could do little but grumble and complain.

After the issuance of the stockshares, business speculators frequently toured the countryside, telling the unwary stockshare holders that the value of the shares they held was very low. They offered cash for these shares at a slightly higher price than they were actually worth, and some landlords in the Hsin Hsing area sold out. Later, they learned that the stock values had risen and that they had been "cheated." This happened mostly to small landlords who lacked business experience. It added to dissatisfaction over the land reform and the feeling that the government had ruined the landlords.

A middle-aged man from one of the formerly big landlord families in the Hsin Hsing area spoke critically of the Land Reform Program and of how it hurt the landlord. Despite his bitterness, however, he admitted that "now the landlord no longer can spend all his time playing around drinking, gambling, and seeing shows. Now, in order to live, he must go out to work and do business. In the old days if the landlord played a lot and needed more money to finance his entertainment, he could just raise his rents."

But, much more important, the Land Reform Program had a major effect on the landlord class in the Hsin Hsing area and possibly in Taiwan generally, and as a result a major effect on the general economy of Taiwan and thus on life in many villages. Before land reform it was traditional in China for the wealthy to buy land for investment or simply for purposes of security. To these landlords, and especially to many urban people, the Land Reform Program made it evident that it was no longer profitable nor even safe to invest their capital in the land. Instead, these people, in addition to their forced participation in industry through being paid in shares of stock for expropriated land, have now in many cases begun to shift their excess capital willingly into industrial, commercial, and small business activities in urban centers and in the smaller market towns. When money was invested in the small market towns, it usually went into financing light industry or small businesses and often meant that the investor needed new technical knowledge. In some cases, the landlords or their sons became greatly involved in business activities, gradually sold off portions of the three *chia* of land which they had been allowed to retain under

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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the land reform act, and used the money for additional investments.

Many former landlords have done poorly at business, and some have even failed because of their lack of experience and training. Others have maintained their economic investments in the villages. Several formerly large landholders in the two villages adjacent to Hsin Hsing continue their activities in their villages and the surrounding area very much as before. Although their landholdings were cut significantly by the land reform, they nevertheless retain their maximum three *chia* of land. Also, in some instances, a number of landlords prior to the 1953 act managed to retain control of more than the three *chia* limit by legally dividing their family and then transferring portions of their land to the names of other members of their family. By virtue of their positions many landlords, especially those who worked as minor officials or civil servants in the local administration or who were well acquainted with officials, became aware of the ins and outs of the proposed land reform laws and so knew exactly how to manipulate their landholdings legally in order to retain as much land as possible.

Even today landlords may, and do, buy land in excess of three *chia* and then hire laborers to till it for them. As long as they do not rent the land out they seem to be safe from legal action. A few landlords who manage to buy additional land are still doing so in the names of other members of their family and in such cases then actually rent the land out to tenants. But it appears that the fear of another Land Reform Program in the future, as well as the increased movement of the landlords' economic interests outside the rural area, serves to deter many landlords from attempting to reaccumulate landholdings, even by the devious but legal means.

Another frequent activity of landlords who have chosen to maintain their economic interests in the Hsin Hsing area is that of moneylending. The small farmer, having little to offer as security, still continues to resort to the local moneylender for cash or other loans. The local moneylender lends fairly large amounts for longer periods of time than any agency of the government or association but, of course, at extremely high interest rates.

The landlords will continue to engage in moneylending as long as the farmer has credit difficulty. If a good profit can be made from moneylending, it is evident that the wealthy landlords will not willingly transfer their economic interests into more productive economic activities.

Traditionally, the village landlord has played a major role in the leadership of his village and its immediate vicinity. During the Japanese period, such leadership roles were greatly reinforced by the Japanese, who preferred to handle village problems through the wealthy landlord class rather than by dealing directly with the "peas-

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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village cleavages worked for his advantage, as did his membership in one of the larger village *tsu* groups with a following that worked hard in the election.

In Hsin Hsing, then, although this man bears the official title of mayor, he is not really accepted as village head. Today, Hsin Hsing village, like many other communities, seems to be virtually leaderless. In Hsin Hsing and in some other villages observed, this has led to a state of civic disorganization in meeting many village problems, especially those concerning relations with other villages. (An example of just such a problem will be discussed in Chapter 6.)

The post-land reform period in the rural area shows signs of being one of social as well as economic transition. Although the landlords still form a definite and important class, the changes taking place may mark the beginning of a decline in the almost exclusive leadership of the landlord or gentry class. There are incipient signs of instability in a traditional social system which had grown out of an unequal distribution of rural wealth and income as a result of the land tenure system. The Land Reform Program which has led many landlords to withdraw their interests from the rural villages appears to be leading to some equalization of social status in rural Taiwan, which may in turn enable new village leaders to become effective.

In the past and, to a lesser degree, in the present, there have been capable villagers who had no opportunity to compete with the landlord class for primary village leadership. Now, perhaps for the first time, these people will have some opportunity to manifest their leadership abilities. But many traditional attitudes must be cleared away before such new leaders can gain widespread acceptance. In addition to actual economic equalization, there must be a more complete equalization of social status in the village. There must be a change in the villagers' own attitudes toward leadership and authority, for they have not yet been emancipated from their respect for wealth and power and the use to which these two can be put in the manipulation of people and politics.

Although the accomplishment of change in this attitude toward leadership and authority is still a long way off, it should be noted that respect for a man is not based entirely on his wealth and power. These qualities in themselves are not enough, but must be accompanied by evidence of responsibility toward the village, active participation in village affairs, and at least an outward appearance of "not looking down on less fortunate fellows."

The consequences of village social disorganization are not fully apparent. However, definite signs of such disorganization were seen in the last chapter in the problems of community organization and cooperation over irrigation, and will be seen in later chapters in the

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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problem of village solidarity. It is perhaps too soon to tell how successful these new leaders will be, but it seems likely that if disorganization continues as a result of the gradual withdrawal from leadership by the landlord class, the most capable among the aspirants for village leadership may find, by necessity, increasing acceptance from their fellows.

EFFECT OF LAND REFORM ON THE LAND MARKET

In the Hsin Hsing area, another effect of the Land Reform Program appears to be a decrease in the free circulation of land, especially in land for rent. Because the 1951 Rent Reduction Act is still in effect, tenants who have contracts are remaining on the land and not giving up their right to tenancy. The landlord can no longer freely change tenants, even when the contract period ends, unless the tenant wishes to give up his rights. At the same time, as the value of rents decline, "the value of leased farm land . . . [is] lower than that of owner cultivated-land" (T'ang, 1954:63). Thus, many landlords do not want to sell their land when its value is low. But even more, under such conditions prospective buyers would gain little from buying land occupied by a tenant who has a contract and a fixed rent.

Landlords who have been tilling some land themselves will very rarely rent it to anyone now. To do so would mean that the landlord, although receiving his 37.5 percent rent, would have little control over his own land. As a former large landlord put it, "Before the Land Reform the landlord made the rules if he wanted more rent. Today the government makes the rules." If the landlord should find that for some reason he no longer can till the land himself, it is more likely that he will hire laborers to work the land. Formerly, he would probably have rented it out. Thus, there is very little land available today for anyone wishing to rent it.

There also seems to be little turnover of publicly and privately owned land which was purchased from the government by former tenants under the 1951 and 1953 acts. Only under great financial stress will such villagers give up their rights to assume full ownership at the end of the ten-year amortization period. According to the 1953 act, a farmer who is unable to continue payments on such land may ask the government to repurchase the land for resale to other farmers. "The Government shall in such a case reimburse to the purchaser in one lump sum the purchase price already paid" (T'ang, 1954:191, translation of the Land-to-the-Tiller Act, 1953, Chapter IV, Article 29). However, despite the law, when such instances have arisen in the Hsin Hsing area, the land has not been resold through the government but by the farmer directly to another farmer who has approached him for additional land to support a growing family.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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Such purchases have a surface appearance of legality, but, strictly speaking, they are not. According to the 1953 law, land purchased from the government under the act can be sold by the original purchaser only after he has become a full owner by completing the twenty payments to the government. In current practice, the purchaser, using a middleman or a land broker, secretly gives the owner enough rice or money to cover the outstanding payments to the government. In addition, he gives him more money or rice to cover the payments already made, plus a substantial bonus. When all the remaining payments have been made, usually in one lump sum, the land is officially turned over to the new owner. By law he must be able to till the land himself. This should eliminate the likelihood of landlords engaging in such transactions. In Hsin Hsing village this method has so far been limited to the small landholder who through expanding financial resources has been able to buy additional land to support an expanding family. Such people cannot easily acquire land through completely legal means because of the decreased turnover of land since land reform.

However, some landlords in the area not only manage to purchase such land reform land by this method but manage to buy back their own land which, expropriated by the government, has since passed through several hands. They may then even rent it out, even though the law says that such expropriated land can only be sold to someone who will till the land himself. According to a reliable informant, this can be managed when the land has passed through several hands since 1953, so that the government agencies have lost track of it and are no longer aware of the history of its transfers. The Land Office responsible for such land can easily lose track of it. The land tenure data are recorded in the Land Office in so many different books and cards that it is difficult to maintain any adequate check on the transfers of individual plots of land. Besides this, not all the data are accurate, or even kept together in one office. In the Hsin Hsing village area for example, some records are kept in the Lukang Land Office and some in the Pu Yen Hsiang Public Office, according to a system for recording land tenure data prescribed by the provincial Land Office in Taipei. In addition, there seems to be little investigation by land agents of the ownership of lands in the area.

Probably the greatest source of purchaseable land since the land reform is private-ownership land which formerly belonged to large landholders. At the time of the expropriation in 1953, many landlords got their start in outside business or commerce, and many have since proved successful. As a result, many of them have sold more and more of the three *chia* of land which the 1953 law allowed them to retain, using the money for further investment in business or light industries. In the Hsin Hsing village area the lands of such former landlords have

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recently represented the largest portion of land available for purchase on the open market. Even such land, however, does not necessarily add a great deal to the land market, since much of it had already been rented out.

The result of this static condition in the land market appears to be an ossification of socioeconomic mobility *within* the rural area. The traditional means for improving one's family's status by acquiring more and more land and the advantages which accrue to the landed are no longer so readily attainable. The main outlet now available for those who have hopes of improving their economic condition is to acquire some kind of business interest, usually outside the Hsin Hsing area, and, in such a case, those people rarely remain part of their native village.

LAND SCARCITY IN HSIN HSING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

We see that in spite of the Land Reform Program (and perhaps in part because of it) and in spite of the apparent increase in the productivity of the land, there has been a continuing land-population imbalance and hence an increasingly serious land scarcity in the rural area. Some of the attempts to solve this continuing problem have already been discussed here. For the remainder of this chapter we will examine in some detail the consequences of one solution to this problem—out-migration—for the villagers, their families, and for the village as a whole, particularly in role behavior and attitudes toward the land.

Even now the problem of a growing population and a resulting land scarcity in the area has greatly affected the lives of many villagers. The most important effect has been an increased mobility to new centers of employment such as Taipei, where villagers carry on small business enterprises or more usually work as unskilled laborers. This trend toward increased mobility has already spread to other villages of the area, and is likely to become more extreme all over the island as the population pressures increase.

The lack of any extensive light industry in the area which could absorb excess local labor leaves little alternative for families which do not have enough land to support them. Even a Hsin Hsing village family which has enough land to support all its members and keep most of them occupied for the greater part of the year must nevertheless contend with the problem of agricultural slack seasons. Some of the young men and women of such families may possibly find employment in the local menthol oil factory or brickworks. Whether full- or part-time, the job is close enough to home so that the villager can go home whenever his labor is required by the family.

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Taipei to sell out their land and leave the village entirely. Such cases have even included joint families, where the whole family, including the old parents, have made the move.

Such increased out-migration of whole families has thus resulted from both the scarcity of available land and the apparently adverse effect of the Land Reform Program on the possibility of acquiring land for purchase or especially for rent. Just as many landlords now realize that the accumulation of land is no longer a safe capital investment, many villagers, who in the past sought social mobility through increased landholdings, now see this avenue as relatively limited. Increasingly, they now look to other nonagriculturally-based sources of livelihood and social mobility.

It appears then that much of the villager's traditional sentiment for his land and, to a lesser extent, his ancestral home not infrequently takes second place if there is a surer way of earning a livelihood and accumulating status and wealth. Again, as we have seen, even landlords who traditionally had the greatest sentiment and attachment for family and ancestral home have now in many instances been selling off their remaining landholdings as more secure and lucrative economic opportunities present themselves in the city.[5] This pattern is not perhaps so unusual; after all, many overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia as well as in Taiwan who left their homes on the mainland and made their fortunes abroad never returned to China but later had their families join them.

The families which prosper in Taipei undoubtedly prefer life there to what they had in the village, but there are still many villagers who work and live in Taipei only because they cannot manage to earn enough to support their families on the land. With very little land in the village, they have no capital to invest, and once in Taipei they must take whatever work is available. The people say that a villager who goes to Taipei as a coolie laborer, as most do, "usually goes as a water buffalo." Such men may very well prefer to stay on the land, but they have no alternative. Although they dislike working in Taipei as "beasts of burden," they frequently complain (along with the villagers who remain tied to the land) that a farmer's life is hard and bitter. "A farmer must go to the fields and work very hard even in rainy or windy weather. He must irrigate the fields if the crops need water, and sometimes pedal water all night to irrigate the fields. In addition, he must pay rice to the Farmers' Association [meaning the Provincial Food Bureau] for taxes and in exchange for fertilizer. In other words, the Farmers' Association takes the rice away from the farmers after they harvest their crops."

At the same time, the villager who remains on the land has dreams of "glory" for the next generation. He usually does not want his son to

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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618 That Hsin Hsing *tsu* are more than merely ceremonial is seen in the way various individual unrelated families, because they share a common surname with a *tsu*, try to identify with it and, to a small degree, do absorb some of the hoped for and actual sociopolitical benefits and security which seem to accrue to members of the larger village *tsu* organizations. (This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.)

618 627 Each village *tsu* can therefore be seen as attempting to exert sociopolitical influence in the village and sometimes also in the immediate area in competition with other *tsu*. So as not to weaken its position in face of the rest of the village, each *tsu* works hard to confine its internal conflicts within the *tsu* itself. Therefore, their own respected (and usually well-off) elders serve as mediators for the solution of intra-*tsu* conflict. In case of inter-*tsu*, general village, or intervillage conflict, these same *tsu* leaders have usually been recognized by the villagers as the most likely people to be able to bring a conflict to a successful solution.

618 As we have seen above and will see more of here and in Chapter 6, the Hsin Hsing village area kinship organizations, despite their relatively small size and minimum formalization, nevertheless do display a relative functional equivalence to Hu's (1948) and Freedman's (1958) images of a *tsu* and thus are clearly to be considered as *tsu* organizations, as they are by their members. One might further note that for the *tsu* organizations in Hsin Hsing village, there appears to be no inherent relationship between structure and function. The most important feature of such groupings is that their activities (such as their sociopolitical ones) be carried out within the local community and perhaps the larger area, and these seem to be carried through here with a minimum of formal structure. Since *tsu* is not to be thought of as a static organizational phenomenon but rather as having a kind of evolution with stages going from incipience through decay, a *tsu* in its early or incipient stages of development could then exist on a very small scale, be rather weak in its formal organization and activities and even in its functional effectiveness, and yet still maintain itself as a *tsu*.

178 618 What is also worth noting (and what we will see more of in Chapter 6), is that conditions in the Taiwanese rural area have been working against the likelihood of these unelaborated *tsu* ever developing into truly mature *tsu*. This seems to be true in the case of the adverse effect on the rural *tsu* organizations by the Japanese during their period of occupation of Taiwan and the recently changing socioeconomic conditions, such as the Land Reform Program, which prohibit the *tsu* from acquiring corporate landholdings and inhibit *tsu* members from achieving great landed wealth within the rural area. In addition, it also appears that as a result of these past and recent developments the

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daughter-in-law who feels that her own husband works the hardest and contributes most to the family's income. The daughter-in-law's reason for wanting the division may, of course, be much more basic, such as being treated badly in the house or wanting independence, but situations like these give her a good excuse. The villagers feel that it is usual for the daughters-in-law to want to divide the family even though their husbands do not. "This is because the woman's mind is smaller than the husband's."

When division-provoking situations do arise, they are frequently aggravated by the desire of the *chia chang* and his wife to minimize strain by distributing the family's wealth and chores equally. They usually see to it that each small family in the *chia* is given food and money for clothing equally and that all the family members, including daughters-in-law, share equally in the work. While this policy is especially designed to prevent jealousy among the daughters-in-law, it can lead to greater ill-feeling when a daughter-in-law, and possibly her husband, contribute much more than the others and yet receive no more for their work.

Under such circumstances as these, then, a family division may occur. It takes place after a general agreement by the whole family that each son will after all work harder and do better for his own small family when he is independent and on his own. However, division is not inevitable. Sometimes one son of a large family may work in Taipei to supplement the family income. If he does well there, an ideal situation for the family may develop, with part of its income coming from the city while the rest of the family stays and works in the village. It has also happened that the son in the city gradually brought his other brothers into the city business and finally, after selling the land in the village, brought the whole family to live in the city. They often remain a single economic household there—at least for a short time. However, on other occasions a son doing well in Taipei has decided that it is best for his own wife and children to benefit by his good fortune, and, by bringing them to live in the city, he has forced the division of the large family.

Sometimes other factors contribute to the early division of large families. Since some of the taxes paid to the government are progressive, a large family with a higher income may divide in the hope of lowering its total taxes. Occasionally, a landlord may wish to accumulate more land and so divides the family and registers the land in different names, which can be done under the land reform laws. Other families may divide in the belief that there is more danger of conscription for men in a large family. Such a recent division, however, is not recognized by the authorities as negating the possibility of kin in other households supporting the soldier's family.

A very strong and authoritarian *chia chang*, or even his wife, can

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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around the house, or just relaxing. A man with few sons and very little land will have to continue to work the land well into his old age.

Although the reasons for family division are varied, there are standard procedures for implementing the process. The actual division is carried out through the customary process of mediation by a person called in to help work out an amicable settlement. This man may be a *tsu* relative, a respected fellow villager, or a maternal relative. Family division entails the equal division among all sons of all property belonging to the large family. All the land must be evaluated according to its productive capacity and location. Where the amount of land cultivated is very small, the members of the family may in rare instances agree to draw lots. The winner of the drawing gets all the land and pays his brothers for their share; they may then go to the city to support their families.

In the division of the house, each new *chia* retains its own apartment or rooms. The family's large brick stove usually goes to the oldest son, while the others use small charcoal stoves until they can build their own brick stoves. Sometimes, until they are well settled under the new family arrangements, the *chia* of the younger brothers may continue to use the original family kitchen and stove.

Although the division often results from or causes bad feelings between the newly formed *chia*, there is a great deal of interaction among the members of the family even after the family property has been divided. Such related families frequently share in the use of certain tools and farm implements, either through mutual lending or joint ownership. Since they are both relatives and neighbors, such families may also continue mutual aid and cooperation with one another in everyday tasks.

THE "ANCESTRAL GROUP"

Perhaps one of the most important unifying factors which joins divided families, as well as *tsu* organizations, is their joint religious activities. Although economic reasons may have divided the larger family, certain religious ceremonies continue to be a joint function. Ancestor worship and participation in funeral rituals for patrilineal relatives are two of the most important religious activities for the family. The one part of the house excepted from the division is the central room known as the *kung t'ing*, which contains the family's ancestral tablets, altar, and sometimes statues of gods which are owned jointly by the families. The room and its contents continue to be the common property of all the members of the separated families.

The conjugal families which now form independent *chia* (economic families) in their turn begin the process of expansion into joint or

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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performed in either the private or main *kung t'ing* by the smaller group. Usually, it is the women who have married into and become part of the *tsu* who perform most of the actual ancestral-worship rituals in Hsin Hsing and other villages of the area. M. Freedman (1958:85) also notes that "The rites performed in the [ancestral] halls [of the *tsu*] were conducted by and in the presence of men; their daughters and wives played no direct part in the proceedings. In the home, in contrast, it is clear that, whatever the theoretical inferiority of women in the sphere of ancestor worship, they occupied a central position in its performance."

Since there are no ancestral halls in Hsin Hsing village or in the local area, this was the case. Worship of ancestors takes place exclusively in the *kung t'ing* of the *tsu* or family. Ancestor worship performed in a hall or in the *tsu kung t'ing* on certain few occasions would be public, a formal observance for all to witness and theoretically conducted by men. But more often in the Hsin Hsing area women conduct it. Ancestor worship, as it generally takes place, is on a small scale, is private, and tends to be rather informal. As a result, the women, in the presence of their children, usually take the main part in carrying out ancestor worship. As some of the villagers noted, "The men are busy, and the women are more religious anyway."

It is partially the unity of the religious family organization, which continues even after the legal economic division of a larger family, that gives the several newly independent *chia* a definite basis for cooperation and a sense of common identity. Of this Freedman (1958:23) has noted that the

> newly separated households were at least potentially members of one ancestor-worshipping unit in relation to recent forebears, and some forms of *ad hoc* economic co-operation might be instituted between them. In other words, while the formal division of house and land, which was a ritually established rupture at one point in time, created legally independent households, the relations between these households might diminish gradually in time rather than undergo a sharp transformation from involvement to indifference.

Although a joint family may not continue for many generations as a single unit, it derives continuity from the maintenance of the religious family, with its function of ancestor worship. To ensure such continuity, marriage and adoption are a primary and conscious concern. In addition to providing the family with the necessary descendants to worship the ancestors, the institutions of marriage and adoption ensure the security of the family through growth and expansion. For the parents these institutions mean security and care in old age as well as in the afterlife. "One's future is in one's children" is a common saying which has had much meaning in traditional China and which is still no less important in the changing Taiwanese village. Besides these

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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Perhaps the most important form of cooperation between patrilineal relatives occurs when one of them has any problem with a nonrelated villager or outsider. Even though the patrilineal relatives may not be on the best of terms, when trouble comes they can usually be depended upon to rally to the support of their fellow kin.

However, while patrilineal kinship is extremely important, it is far from being the only relating factor operative in the village. Often the families within any particular patrilineal groups in Hsin Hsing are not on the best of terms. Hsu (1949:129) points out for West Town, Yunnan, that "Even among families whose heads are brothers and first cousins (patrilineal) there is little solidarity. Most of them do not like each other. Only when there is trouble with outsiders do they tend to unite to some degree. But such unity is very temporary." Hsu's statement has some validity for Hsin Hsing; the overintimacy and also the frequent feeling of competition between related families often tends to cause conflict between them.

In discussions with Hsin Hsing villagers, the relationships between all village families tend to be described in terms of *kan-ch'ing*, good or bad. As already noted in Chapter 3, Fried (1953:226–227) defines *kan-ch'ing* as a concept or code of relationships between non-kin of different status, which differs from friendship in that it "includes a recognized degree of exploitation." However, in the Hsin Hsing area, I have found that the term is extended to cover the quality of kin relationships as well. In other words, the Hsin Hsing village area people use *kan-ch'ing* to describe the quality of any relationship between people whose relative positions are in some way differentiated in a hierarchy, whether in class, economic, family, or kinship structure.

Thus, in the Hsing Hsing area, I found that villagers not only refer to their *kan-ch'ing* with a landlord, a tenant, and so on, but also use this same term to describe their relations with *ch'in tsu* and *ch'in ch'i* relatives. We have already seen that when a tenant reports that he has bad *kan-ch'ing* with his landlord it means that he and the landlord are not behaving toward one another in accordance with the relations prescribed or expected on the basis of their relative positions as landlord and tenant in the socioeconomic system. Similarly, when a villager cites his bad *kan-ch'ing* with a relative, for example, he means that for whatever reasons they have not been displaying the kinds of behavior toward one another prescribed by their relative positions in the hierarchal kinship system. As a result, the feeling or sentiment (the *kan-ch'ing*) is not good between them. Close patrilineal kinship, therefore, does not necessarily determine the nature of one's personal feelings and overt behavior within the relationship.

In Hsin Hsing village, as we have already noted, the *tsu* groups do

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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618 not hold in common any significant amount of corporate land which
• 423 could function as a source of unity by necessitating organization to administer such lands. Such *tsu* organization might easily tend to extend to other phases of *tsu* relationships and so possibly act as an additional unifying factor. On the other hand, Freedman (1958:63–76) points out that on the mainland large *tsu* holdings have often been controlled by the wealthier members of the group, which sometimes results in conflict rather than unity. But again, as Hsu (1949:129–130, note) points out for West Town and other places, such a lack of significant *tsu* corporate land is very common.

618 Because Hsin Hsing village *tsu* groups are relatively small and gen-
474 erally not prosperous, they are limited in their ability to meet all the economic needs of their members or to fulfill the social needs of all the different personality types of the group. The small size of these *tsu* and other patrilineal kinship groups as well as the personality differences between some *ch'in tsu* relatives make it desirable for the cooperative ownership of machines and also cooperative work efforts to extend to non-kin friends and neighbors in the village if work is to be done effectively.

618 Even a member of a *tsu* group frequently forms close friendships
857 from childhood on with non-*tsu* fellow villagers. For example, friend-
572 ships through age groups of children and young people are quite common in Hsin Hsing. Children's play groups to a great extent are composed of children of the same sex and age. Because they necessarily live near each other, they are therefore most often relatives. In addition, however, they frequently include children who are neighbors but not kin-related and, as the age of the group increases, also non-kin children who come from other parts of the village. The latter may be schoolmates whose friendships become very deep and last into adulthood.

573 Some of the groups of boys who have been close friends since child-
hood become sworn brothers (*chieh pai hsiung ti*) in their late teens or early twenties. In doing so, such boys—usually in groups of about five to ten—make an informal pact which is often celebrated by a dinner. In their organization as sworn brothers they agree to help each other, cooperate in many of the ordinary chores of life, and aid each other in any emergency. There are also certain occasions, such as the birth of a child or the death of a parent, when the sworn brothers band together to render assistance above and beyond that expected of ordinary villagers. The membership of such a group for the most part crosses kinship lines, since as some sworn brothers once observed, [618] "There is no point in *tsu* relatives becoming sworn brothers."

571 All of these friendships and special relationships, if continued into
621

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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Formosa AD1

ment of the local area. In such villages, composed of a single large *tsu* organization, the *tsu* could virtually control the lives of its member families, unite the entire village population on the basis of common kinship, and thus furnish security to all its members. But even villages like Hsin Hsing, fragmented into many small kinship groups, found their security in complete identity with the village, which made it possible for them to band together and cooperate for mutual security against the everday dangers and problems.

The coming of the Japanese at the end of the nineteenth century saw the introduction of a strong central government which led to an increased orderliness of life. The Japanese also introduced an expanded and efficient system of communications and public health and sanitation measures. These measures, coupled with a stable and secure life, made possible a radical increase in population which became even more pronounced in the late 1940's and 1950's under the Nationalist Chinese government. As all of these developments took place, particularly the maintenance of local order, the ties of the village began to loosen with the loss of its protective function and ability to initiate control beyond its own village boundaries.

In Hsin Hsing (and probably other villages like it), some of the numerous kinship groups began to increase in size and develop into *tsu* organizations as described in Chapter 3. With growth, each group became increasingly concerned with its own sociopolitical influence within the village and even in the nearby area, especially as the former imperative necessity for village unity declined. Thus, Hsin Hsing began to develop into a village with several significant competing *tsu* organizations which started, to some degree, to undercut the formerly necessary coalition of the different village kinship groups. So began the weakening of Hsin Hsing village as a unified community.

As the population increase continued in recent decades, and an already developing problem of land scarcity became even more extreme, it gradually became both necessary and possible for increasing numbers of rural villagers to migrate to the growing cities to find work to supplement their insufficient income from the land. This migration has broadened the villagers' urban contacts and relationships beyond the village. At about the same time, as we have seen in earlier chapters, the villagers have become increasingly more dependent upon and involved with the greater market economy. This has become especially true as patterns of land use have changed in response to all of the changing conditions, so that many villagers are increasingly shifting from what was primarily a subsistence form of agriculture to what is now participation in the market economy of the country. Therefore, there has been an acceleration of the impingement on the village by the outside world.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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changed significantly, but the villagers' attitude toward it certainly has. Today, the individual small family is becoming the most significant unit in terms of actual behavior and values.

In Hsin Hsing, internal family conflict remains a primary cause of family division, but new forces place an added strain between conjugal units. The increased pressure of population on an insufficient land base leads sons to migrate to the city to work, and the increased economic value this gives the sons weakens the father-son tie and generally speeds up the undermining of the father's authority. Women have greater economic importance now; this frequently leads to delayed marriage. A girl upon marriage is thus older and more mature, which tends to weaken her mother-in-law's authority over her. And as the authority of the elders weakens, the tie between husband and wife is strengthened. Add to this a growing demand for widely available material goods, and we can easily see the potential these factors contain for independence of the conjugal unit, a potential which has undoubtedly had an important bearing on family division.

At the same time, the increasingly greater impingement by the government on the local area has created forces which further family division. The conscription of men, land reform, and taxation, all noted in Chapters 4 and 5, have made it beneficial for families to divide. While it is true that family division has not increased significantly, it is noteworthy that all these new factors added to the balance already weighed down by internal conflict have tipped the scales so that family division now takes place openly. There is little attempt to disguise division, and where the pressures of government impingement make it seem advantageous, divsion is almost advertised. The openness with which division now takes place might in itself yet become a new force of strain within the joint family leading to division; a habitual example can become a weighty model on which to base a demand.

The significance of such demands by the small family unit for independence from the restraints of the larger joint family does not, however, imply an analogous call for independence from their more loosely organized and less demanding large kinship group or *tsu*. This has never been the case in Hsin Hsing nor, for that matter, in mainland China generally, according to most of the ethnographies. The villagers continue to lean on their *tsu* or other smaller and less organized patrilineal kin groups for many activities and functions, since they are the only basic groupings with which villagers maintain continuous, uniform, stable relations. This larger group is the sociopolitical organization most likely to work in their and their entire family's behalf over the years.

However, the villagers also feel a certain amount of socioeconomic need and desire for relations with non-kin villagers and outsiders,

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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lages with whom they have developed strong relationships on the basis of being *ch'in ch'i* or friends.

The apparently recent relative importance of these latter connections stems from the individual family's increased need to solidify matrilateral and affinal relationships as well as friendship ties outside the village for purposes of status and socioeconomic security. The intensity of these relationships beyond the village in many cases surpasses those with non-kin fellow villagers. These relationships, however, must not and do not supercede loyalty to *ch'in tsu*.

Villagers today, therefore, continue to prefer marriage with nonrelatives or strangers with whom they can establish outside *ch'in ch'i* relationships which will lead to added security. Such connections better fit the present socioeconomic and political needs of villagers who no longer necessarily find it advantageous to focus their relationships within the village or even to continue to live in the village. In turn extra-village contacts, once developed, tend to reinforce the growing socioeconomic self-reliance of the economic family unit already heightened by mobility and nonvillage-based relationships.

We have already seen how these factors have weakened the villagers' traditional ties to their home village and *tsu*. But at the same time, the impingement of the government, through its Land Reform Program, has played a part in this process. In Chapter 4 we saw how the land reform, by placing limitations on the accumulation of land, affected the traditional means by which social status and leadership can be achieved. Thus, stimulated by such a complex of developments, we find that more and more villagers are far from averse to the sale of their land for immediate financial advantage.

Often the family, *tsu*, or village cannot exert the necessary pressure to keep the land in the hands of the family or at least among members of the larger kinship group. This is partly because of the relatively small and weakened state of *tsu* organization in the Hsin Hsing village area and partly because of the weakening of the organization of the village itself. Where either *tsu* or village organization was strong, the situation could be quite different. Fei and Chang (1948:126) noted in their 1939–1943 study in Yunnan province that it was a duty of "clansmen" to retain land inherited from ancestors and that custom decreed that such land be sold only to "clan" members. Only if "clan" members were unable to buy the land or to assist their kinsman in "extricating himself from his financial difficulties" could the land be sold to an outsider. In such case, all the "near members of the seller's clan" would have to consent to the sale in writing, and if this were not done the sale was "both customarily and legally invalid."

However, for many village families in the Hsin Hsing village area, whatever feeling of intimacy or even reverence they may retain for the

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

native soil, it usually becomes unimportant in the face of better economic opportunities off the land. As we saw in Chapter 4 especially, it is not only peasants who will willingly sell their land once other forms of economic security are firmly established elsewhere, but even the wealthy landlord of long-standing tradition on the land in the area. Such a man who, if anyone, is well indoctrinated with the concept of the Great (Confucian) Tradition and the value placed on ancestral land has willingly sold off not only sections of land since the land reform but even his total family landholdings when outside commercial investment seemed more feasible. When a peasant family establishes itself in Taipei or another urban center and retains its land, it apparently does so for economic security only, not for the land's "symbolic value." Also, migration to a city by Hsin Hsing area villagers if economically successful, is very frequently conceived as a permanent rather than a temporary family move. This seems to be quite different from numerous observations in various areas of the mainland by Kulp (1925:42–45), M. Yang (1945:229), and C. K. Yang (1959:71–75), where migration was almost always undertaken as a temporary measure.

Families who remain in the village regardless of their inability to reap an adequate living from insufficient landholdings do so because they consider village life a more desirable way to live. Since there is little industry and few steady work opportunities in the local area, some find low paying and seasonal jobs as local laborers or establish some kind of itinerant business operation to supplement their meager income. Others are switching from the traditional rice crops to cash crops such as vegetables for market. This development has occurred despite the obstacles which the government, perhaps inadvertently, places in the way of farmers who wish to grow almost anything other than rice as their main crop.

Apparently, these people care more for the continued enjoyment of a rural mode of life than for the land itself. Many, having tried city life and work, come back to live and work in the village primarily because they did not like the urban conditions. These people do not remain in the village and on the land for conservative reasons or as a reaction to change. In Hsin Hsing, it is this group of people which is most active in the community. They bring about internal economic and social changes in the village through their attempt to improve agricultural methods, which brings them into contact with government and JCRR agriculture agents as well as with farmers in the surrounding rural area. This group stands in contrast to a larger group of conservative villagers who have continued to cultivate their diminishing land base in the traditional manner.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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It becomes evident then that there has been significant change in the traditional Chinese value toward the land held earlier. Were it not for fellow villagers and *ch'in tsu* who still are critical of those who sell off their land in the indiscriminate manner in which it is so often done today, and for those villagers who still prefer the village and the agricultural way of life, it would be tempting to deny almost completely any residue of the feeling of "reverence or intimacy" toward the land which the peasant may have held in the past.

The villagers' attitude toward education is another evidence of the lack of real attachment to the land and village. Education to them means a way to rise above the life of a farmer or farm worker, although they do not necessarily expect it to raise them to civil service or elite status. Their primary interest in education is the attainment of an easier life, financial betterment, and power for the individual family. Thus, typically, village farmers want their daughters to marry businessmen. Education has far less inherent value of its own per se than it had in the Confucian tradition, and the materialistic ambitions are against the tradition as well.

Today there are few well-educated villagers who remain active in village affairs in the Hsin Hsing area. Usually, they go into business outside the village or accept employment in local government, such as in the district Public Office. When a man establishes a business outside the village area, as we saw happening after the land reform, he usually shifts his social as well as his economic interests. Once he accepts a position in local government, the educated villager tends to become cliquish and spend most of his time with high-status fellow government employees. Because of his position, he may be called upon by his village to help in certain problem situations, but generally, he takes little interest in most of his village's affairs and does little to furnish leadership. To a great degree nowadays in rural Taiwan, as a result of the new paths to status, education has come to have consequences contrary to the traditional function of education in the society. It now tends to foster greater individualism and detachment from the village and the local larger kinship group, and at times even from one's family.

This attitude held toward the village by the educated man who, usually, is financially well off, begins during earlier student days. Almost immediately upon entering middle school, the bond between the student and his fellow villagers weakens—that is except for those who happen to be school chums. Thus, only in a limited number of cases do middle school graduates serve as leaders or innovators in their village. The relatively better educated village members rarely enrich any of the village community functions, nor do they by their own

1:Gallin E-4.5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

example bolster the declining role of the village as a source of security and identification. Considering their potential, such men contribute relatively little to their villages.

Coupled with this has been the more recent decline of the traditional landlord leadership as an effect of the Land Reform Program and an ever-increasing vacuum of qualified leadership which has developed in the village. When leadership was sorely needed, as in the Li Fan case for example, the villagers actually turned to me, the alien anthropologist, as a potential source of leadership and help. Many former leaders, now prefer not to become too involved in other people's problems or those of the village. In fact, it is now often difficult for villages to find qualified and respected men even to run for the office of mayor or to assume the responsibilities of a leadership role.

The ever-increasing vacuum of qualified leadership affects not only the operation of the village but that of the *tsu* organizations. One important area of village life adversely affected by the lack of leadership is the apparently increasing inability to resolve local conflict by the traditional method of mediation which was usually carried on by respected *tsu*, village, or area leaders. A particular mediator was selected according to the relationship of the disputants and the nature of the conflict, which might involve intravillage or intervillage disputes over water for irrigation; disputes over landownership and property boundaries; or power struggles between families, especially between *tsu* organizations, over such questions as village administration or the expenditure of funds by village or *tsu* for religious or festive activities; and so on.

Almost always, regardless of the nature of the dispute or the level on which it occurred, mediation had been sought and applied with these aims: first, that the scope and resolution of the conflict be kept localized so as not to invite possible government interference into village affairs, and, second, that the resolution permit the diputants to continue to live harmoniously together. Villagers felt a great degree of permanency since most, tied as they were to the land and to their village, were likewise tied by the particular kinds of relationships developed over the years with local people, both kin and non-kin. There were few opportunities to leave the area, land, or kinship group and go elsewhere so as to avoid the repercussions of an ill-settled dispute.

In recent years, however, it has been becoming increasingly difficult to resolve conflict through mediation and to achieve these aims. In part this is a result of the deterioration of the accepted hierarchal relationship system on both the kin and non-kin levels. On the non-kin level the concept or code of *kan-ch'ing* (as discussed in Chapter 6) and the quality of interpersonal relations governed by it have been weakened. The situation developed largely when the traditional land

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

The situation developed largely when the traditional land tenure system was modified by Taiwan's Land Reform Program between 1949–1953. An important aspect of the reform was the initiation of a rent reduction and limitation law, but even more important was the introduction of an official contract between landlord and tenant which secured the tenant's rights on the land whatever the relationship, good or bad *kan-ch'ing*, he had with the landlord. The contract for the first time made it clear that the relationship between landlord and tenant and their mutual responsibilities were economic. Once their interaction was limited to an economic relationship as circumscribed by an official contract, it was no longer as important whether either party concerned himself with the traditional maintenance of good *kan-ch'ing*.

Thus, in addition to the already discussed decline of some landlords' socioeconomic and even political interests in the village as a result of the land reform, the deterioration in the basis of *kan-ch'ing*, and with it the prestige of many in the landlord class, has frequently meant that unless landlords who remained in the village had other ways of maintaining their high positions in the community, they lost their usefulness as mediators, being no longer capable of exerting influence and leadership in the community.

On the kinship level, the code which regulated relationships between hierarchal unequals has likewise been affected by change, thus worsening the community's ability to resolve local social conflict. This has occurred on the levels of the *tsu* and even, to some degree, the family. In conflict within the *tsu* or village, as well as beyond the village, the *tsu* organizations through their leaders have always played a role in settling all conflict by mediation. While the several Hsin Hsing *tsu* have never been powerful organizations backed by extremely wealthy members and wealth in corporate land usually necessary to give them extensive local sociopolitical influence, *tsu* authority has recently been further weakened, as we have seen above, by the extension of the villagers' socioeconomic interests beyond the home area. As a result, even the *tsu* have apparently lost much of their ability to exert sanctions against their own members or their opponents. Thus, as a result of the weakening of the social hierarchy, there has developed a more general inability to use the former traditional respect for particular leaders of the landlord class or *tsu* as a force with which to settle disagreements.

It is not purely a matter of the weakening of the traditional hierarchical relationships between people, however, which has diminished the respect for traditional mediators. This has been intensified by the tendency toward a growing equalitarianism on both the social and economic levels of life among the villagers. The tendency was born of greater educational opportunities, increased election of officials, land

776 installed in a small temple. They also brought an earth
778 god statue (T'u Ti Kung) which was established in another very small temple. Both temples have remained important in the village through to the present. About 30 years after the settlement was established, a large temple was built. It was destroyed in a 1943 typhoon and rebuilt after World War II.

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[423] The original settlers constituted a corporate group who cleared and cultivated the land in shares. Some years passed before the jointly-owned land was divided among the 18 share holders. In essence, the community constituted a single surname village, not unlike the description furnished for many communities in Southeast China where it may be considered to have originated (Freedman, 1958). No other village in the li was a single surname village. Moreover, it appears that the settlers in other Talei villages came from a variety of villages in Mainland China rather than one. Sanlei has always maintained a higher level of integration and cooperation than surrounding villages. Although almost all early settlers were surnamed Liao, they were not all able to specify their degree or details of relationship. The story of the eighteen shareholders and the problems they encountered are widely known to villagers although there is some dispute over minor details. Anyone who has lived in the village a year or two will be able to repeat the

4:Barnett E-4.5 (1965-1967) 1970 AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5
Sanlei Ts'un

CHAPTER III

THE ECONOMIC BASE

434 Economically, Sanlei Village is first of all a
621 farming community. Although there are other significant sources contributing to community income, a vast majority of the households earn all or a significant segment of their income from agricultural activities. Only five of the sixty-six households have no direct involvement in agriculture.

433 There are four commercially significant agricul-
438 tural products in the Sanlei area: rice, tea, oranges, and wood. Although a large portion of the rice and wood production is for family consumption within the village, the major share of the four products is produced for the market. The market is a primary external force impinging
[628] on village activities. To participate effectively in the market, villagers are forced to establish and maintain extra-village social relationships.

Land and Land Tenure

423 All the land within the village boundaries of San-lei has been classified and graded by the government. The

The
423 amount of annual taxes varies considerably according to
651 the classification and grade and various government land reform acts affected only certain categories of land. The most important and valuable kind of land is that classified as paddy field, most of it grade 12 or 13. The grade number assigned reflects productivity and consequently taxes, the higher the number, the lower the value.
[435] The current market price is $180,000.00 per chia, nearly $1,900.00 U.S. per acre.

311 As pointed out in the section on topography, San-
243 lei is in a narrow valley between two small mountain chains. The only paddy land is on the terraced steps which comprise the valley floor between the sharply rising foothills. Paddy land totals only 13.2920 chia (see Table 3), less than 32 acres. This is divided into 200 plots ranging in size from .0002 chia to .4716 chia. The mean size is .0665 chia (.16 acres), but this figure does not faithfully portray the real situation for the mean has been increased by a few larger plots. The median figure of .0350 (.08 acres) indicates that fifty per cent of the plots are less than half the mean. This extreme case of land fragmentation is partially due to a historical accident and partially due to the normal Chinese inheritance pattern.

As previously stated, Sanlei was founded around
95 1830 by 18 hu (households) from the same community in
423
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311 Table 3. Sanlei Land Types and Distribution
*In chia (One chia equals 2.39 acres)

Land Category	Number of Plots	Median Size*	Mean Size*	Area Total*
Paddy	200	.0350	.0665	13.2920
Dry	124	.0435	.1698	21.0568
Woods	103	.1440	.2936	30.2435
House	61	.0185	.0228	1.5066
Burial	17	.0230	.1629	2.7685
Other	34	.0238	.0564	1.9188
			TOTAL	70.7862

175 Fukien. According to informants and confirmed by family
423 histories, the original land was improved and brought into
311 cultivation by the 18 hu acting as a corporate group. The
423 earliest settlement was a walled fort, frequently under attack by the aborigines who inhabited the nearby mountains. While some men worked in the fields, others were detailed as lookouts and guards. The lands were owned jointly and produce was shared communally. After a few short years (the exact date is uncertain), a decision was made to divide the land. There are suggestions that this was the original plan but there are also strong hints that the division process was one that caused considerable discord and may have been the outgrowth of a previous conflict. In any case, each large piece of land, by type and location, was divided into 18 equal plots, one for each household. The matching of household to plot was accomplished by withdrawing a slip of paper from a hat with chopsticks. Since there were several original large plots,

• 423 each household received a number of one-eighteenth sections. Subsequent to the division, some households continued developing land, creating additional plots more remote from the village center. Additional households migrated in and others died off. Some plots were purchased and others were developed. This historical pattern meant the villagers had started with smaller than average plot sizes.

428 The traditional Chinese pattern of equal inheritance by all the sons compounded the problem. In practice, equal inheritance often meant that if a man had four sons and four plots of land, each son obtained one-fourth of each plot. Conceivably, each son could have received one of the four plots, but plots regularly vary in quality and convenience to the village center and it usually proved impossible to find four that were equal.

423 There were counter-trends to the fragmentation. An individual might inherit two neighboring pieces from father and uncle or he might buy a piece neighboring his own. There was some consolidation by trading. Men who owned two small adjacent plots in two different locations could trade one plot in order to own two in only one location. This occurred but was infrequent because of the necessity for establishing equality. The only such consolidation that took place during our stay in the village, involved a trade of a slightly more valuable .008 chia

423 piece for a .009 chia piece plus a sum of cash, and was the culmination of a two-year negotiation process.

311 243 The registered plot sizes are not directly related to the size of the paddy fields. Larger plots may be divided into two or more fields and some smaller plots are combined into one field. Both the extreme fragmentation and the narrowness of the terraces contribute to the small size of paddies. Correlated with the small size is the complete absence of gasoline-powered cultivators which have become so popular on the plains. This degree of fragmentation does not permit the most efficient use of the land. The government has begun a program of land consolidation in other parts of the island (Department of Information, Taiwan Provincial Government, 1962:78-83). Although villagers are aware of the program and believe it would be a valuable step for the village, everyone fears he would not get a reasonable share in a government-ordered consolidation, i.e., he would give up pieces more valuable than he would receive. Although theoretically the process should be seen as a zero-sum game, no villager can be found who thinks he would be a winner or even break even.

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423 424 659 Prior to the above-discussed land consolidation, Taiwan underwent an extensive land reform program which proceeded through three steps. The first step was rent reduction, enforced in April of 1949, which limited farm

4:Barnett E-4.5 (1965-1967) 1970 AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5
Sanlei Ts'un

423 427 656 rent to a maximum of 37.5 per cent of the total main crop yield (C. Chen, 1961). Since the usual rent in the Sanlei area averaged about fifty per cent of the main crop, this reduction immediately affected the economic situation of village tenants. It had a secondary effect of reducing the land value of tenanted land because the rental income was lowered and flexibility was lost due to the requirements for a minimum lease of six years, binding on heirs, successors, and assigns.

423 The second step involved the sale of public land in a series of six successive sales between 1948 and 1958 (Koo, 1968:36) with most plots sold after 1951 (Koo, 1968: 35). There was no paddy land affected by these sales in Sanlei although some villagers did acquire mountain land in the various sales. According to villagers and by notation on land records, the sale of mountain land to tenants in Sanlei had actually begun under the Japanese.

The third step was the Land-to-the-Tiller Act of 1953 which was designed to accomplish three basic objectives:

> (1) to help tenants acquire landownership without increasing financial burden; (2) to protect the interests of landlords; and (3) to convert land-holdings into industrial holdings (Koo, 1968:37).

In essence, land was compulsorily purchased from certain landlords and sold on easy terms to their tenants. The

property subject to forced sale included a landlord's excess over 3.0 chia, land owned jointly, and land owned by a lineage or temple (C. Chen, 1961). This too had little effect in Sanlei because the village never had high rates of tenancy. It is estimated that 75% of the paddy land was owner-cultivated before the land reform program. As described above, much of Sanlei land is not of high quality. Traditionally, there has been a higher percentage of owner-operated fields where most land is low quality (Kirby, 1960:70). In the Land-to-the-Tiller program, only 15 Sanlei paddy plots totaling 1.0175 chia, less than 8% of the paddy land, changed hands. Three of these plots were part of one man's excess holdings over 3.0 chia and one was owned by a temple. The remaining plots were lost because a tenant was renting land held by joint owners.

There were no large land-holdings in the area immediately around Sanlei but large holdings were common closer to Hsin Tien where land grades of 6 or 7 are common. One landlord who owned 30 chia of paddy fields lived in T'oulei but only a small portion of his holdings were located in Talei Li.

A typical case to illustrate a transfer (forced sale) was that of Liao Mou-tu and Liao Mou-ti, two of the wealthier villagers (Liao Mou-tu's chia is diagramed in Figure 5). These two men were brothers whose household had divided but subsequently, had jointly purchased .05

423 chia of paddy land two years prior to the Land-to-the-Tiller act. Due to its location, they let it out to a tenant and, in turn, rented as tenants an equivalent piece adjacent to their respective main holdings. They lost the purchased piece to the tenant but were unable to claim the rented equivalent piece since it was owned by a small landlord, one with less than 3.0 chia. There were several [601] similar cases in the li. Often there was bitterness generated in the exchanges for the landlord-tenants were sometimes ch'in t'ang (agnatic relatives by virtue of possessing the same surname) and even ch'in tsu (agnatic relatives with demonstrated descent).

311 The second most important category was dry land which was quite fragmented but less so than paddy land. The total of 21.0568 chia is divided into 124 plots for a mean size of .1698 chia. The range is from .0003 chia to 2.5435 chia. The medium of .0435 chia once again indicates most plots are considerably smaller than the mean. 244 This land is devoted primarily to tea, oranges, sweet po- 245 tatoes and miscellaneous vegetables. The biggest plot, 311 2.5435 chia, is a single tea farm cultivated by hired labor but owned by a Sanlei villager. Dry land typically is grade 19, less valuable than paddy fields.

311 The third and largest category is mountain or wooded land, 30.2435 chia. Some of this has been left in

311 natural vegetation and forestation but much is being devel-
[423] oped. A considerable quantity of the mountain land in Sanlei and also outside village boundaries is owned by the government. Some has been purchased by villagers for the
427 government is encouraging its development. Prior to 1962,
435 it was leased by the government for 25% of the main crop but now, rent is fixed and reasonable, on long-term leases
435 at $380.00 per chia per year. The current price of mountain land is about $20,000.00 per chia if undeveloped and ranging up to $100,000.00 per chia if planted with excellent crops such as mature fruit trees.

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311 The remaining categories are important but not economically significant. Houseland land is that on which the house is built but also includes the very small vegetable gardens adjacent to the houses. Vegetable gardens are located near the house so as to be convenient for the deposit of night soil. Burial land takes up a considerable part of the community. As previously stated, this area has many good feng shui locations, most of them on steep slopes. Other types of land categories include temple, roads, and worthless plots.

423 The vast majority of the land in Sanlei remains either owner-cultivated or leased from the government. Moreover, the owner-cultivators tend to live in Sanlei or
427 an adjacent village. Some tenants are renting from a fellow villager as illustrated by the neighbor who leases

427 .17 chia of paddy field from the barber. The absentee landlord is relatively rare, often a former villager who migrated to the city.

123 Sanlei villagers also own land outside the village
423 but we were only permitted to check official records inside the village boundaries of Sanlei and Erhlei. It is difficult to obtain accurate figures through interviews since there is a fear of tax increases. As a result, the disparity between villagers' reports and official holdings was striking. Records of outside holdings kept being refined all during the study by following men to work in the fields. People would reveal more about their neighbors' holdings than their own.

423 Some of the categories and grades are inaccurately
127 recorded on official records. No piece is overgraded be-
651 cause the township land official is contacted to report losses, i.e., caused by erosion, in order to have the taxes reduced. On the other hand, improved land is not called to the attention of officials. Some of the dry land is really paddy land and some of the mountain land is now dry
[654] land with orange orchards or tea fields. Over a four year period there was a Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction (J.C.R.R.) and farmers' association sponsored soil conservation program for mountain land. When a farmer constructed proper terracing, he was rewarded with United
[651] States surplus flour. Only about 60% of the mountain-land

423 owners participated because of a fear the improved land [651] would be given a higher grade resulting in increased taxes. Although reassessment has still not occurred, non-participants keep saying it soon will.

Irrigation

132 Rainfall in northern Taiwan is reasonably adequate 133 every month of the year. There are small mountains running parallel to the village on each side with a small 312 stream down the middle. The mountains produce a considerable water run-off which is channeled to the paddy fields where needed. Only about once every seven or eight years is there a serious shortage of water but there are slight shortages yearly in June and July. There are no water irrigation associations because there is so much surplus water and so many places that it can be tapped, that the small short channels are maintained informally by farmers in the few fields using each source. Only once in fifteen months did we observe a conflict over water levels in spite of these extremely informal arrangements. However, children get in trouble when they play in the fields and break down the barriers and let water fall below requisite levels.

Rice

243 Paddy fields are considered to be the most valuable 311 kind of agricultural land. From the earliest inception of

178 neighbors into the business as partners. The business
291 seemingly filled a necessary niche and one man taught
472 another and before long, over 30 of the 40 families in Sanlei were engaged full-time or part-time in the clog business for a man often could earn more making clogs than he could as a farm laborer.

[458] Business dropped off slightly during the war be-
[177] cause of a shortage of labor although two villagers branched into the production of the thick Japanese clogs and installed a special machine in the village. After the war, there was another spurt in production but the plastic industry (replacing saisal bands) and mass production techniques came to Taiwan and as a result, the village clog business was totally wiped out within six months.

Both the inauguration of the clog business and its eventual demise were factors affecting village life. The inauguration was especially important for women's roles as will be illustrated.

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• 423 The literature which deals with underdeveloped countries often calls attention to the shortage of land. In Sanlei village there is a felt need for more land, particularly paddy fields which is openly expressed and reflected in the artificially high price of the land. That is, the rate of return from a rented piece of paddy land is currently not as much as can be earned by selling

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423 the land and putting the money in many other kinds of investment.

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461 It is not profitable to discuss land values without reference to the kind of crops and the technological sys-
464 tem employed in the community. A village can be viewed
121 on one level as a potential labor pool. That is, all its members are capable of contributing increments of labor which vary in accordance with age and physical condition. There are few societies (if any) which maximize utility or achievement of this potential for there are always periods set aside for rest and recreation and certain individuals, particularly children, the aged, and often women, are not assigned responsibilities commensurate with their physical potential. A community seems to aim at some reasonable level of satisfaction although the target may be raised or lowered over time.

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621 At the time the clog business was introduced, San-
461 lei was an agricultural village surrounded by fields oper-
464 ating in terms of a technological system which required
182 certain inputs of man hours to manage its crops. Over
241 time, a system had developed for assigning certain individuals requisite portions of the necessary labor inputs and as expected, women, children, and old people were especially underemployed.

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241 The clog industry required adult male labor inputs
462 which tended to be drawn out of the agricultural labor
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